TWELVE STORIES OF POLICY INFLUENCE FROM ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

Grupo FARO

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ASIES’s case: The Grand National Campaign for Education in Guatemala

About ASIES

The Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES)³, which emerged from the Guatemalan political conflict of 1979, was founded in 1982 and became a legal entity in 1988. It is a pluralistic civil association that fully respects the different political, social, economic, and professional views and activities of its associates.

In 1979 a corrupt government used ballot rigging to take power and, amidst the escalation of internal armed conflict, instated an authoritarian regime that prevented any form of political opposition. In the context of increasing repression and international isolation, a group of people committed to enforcing human rights and democracy decided to create an organization inspired by humanist and democratic principles: ASIES.

In January 1980, ASIES organized its first seminar on the national reality, which dealt with the political, social, and economic situation of the country. Several of its members were threatened following this event and the association was forced to keep a low public profile until 1982, when it made proposals for the law creating the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Civil Registry, which laid the groundwork for the election of the National Constituent Assembly (1984) and the first democratic government (1985).

In 1992, as the Peace Accords were being negotiated, ASIES produced a number of framework documents that helped define some of the content of the accords, including the “Agreements on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, “Socioeconomic Aspects and Agricultural Situation”, “Strengthening Civil Power”, and “The Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society”.

ASIES is able to independently shape its agenda thanks to its diverse funding sources. It also exerts political influence on both public opinion and decision-makers. ASIES’s strengths lie in its progress institutionalizing administrative and research processes as well as its success diversifying its funding sources. Since its inception, ASIES has received strong support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) of Germany. In addition, research and projects have been implemented with funds from international organizations, including the UN system, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and international cooperation agencies, among others. International organizations fund 75 percent of its annual budget and another 18 percent comes from international foundations.

Background

The Gran Campaña Nacional Por la Educación (GCNPE)⁴ emerged in 1999 as a social movement made up of several institutions, social organizations, and the media, that aimed to improve the country’s education system. It began with a request to the Congress of Guatemala to increase the educational

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³ Association for Research and Social Studies.
⁴ Grand National Campaign for Education.
budget, one of the lowest in Latin America. This request, which has been repeated over the years, is enduring evidence of the GCNPE members’ genuine concern. In order to achieve this objective, the GCNPE developed the "Analysis of proposed guidelines for the increase and quality of Ministry of Education expenditure with a medium-term outlook and a projection for 2005-2007".

From 2001 to the present (May 2012), the rectors of four universities, including the state university, have played a significant role in coordinating the GCNPE. In 2001, the Technical Group was created, comprising representatives of the universities of San Carlos of Guatemala, Rafael Landívar University, Universidad Del Valle, Mariano Gálvez University, Universidad del Istmo, Universidad San Pablo, the Episcopal Conference, Businesspeople for Education, UNICEF, Save the Children, HPP-USAID, and ASIES. ASIES has been the Executive Secretariat of the Grand Campaign from its beginning.

The proposal

The original initiative involved a request to the Congress of Guatemala for an increase in the educational budget for the year 2000. At that stage, the GCNPE set the following objectives:

- To influence the formulation of education policies with a long-term outlook and within the framework of cultural diversity, decentralization, and Educational Reform proposals.
- To ensure increasing educational coverage and quality education that is both relevant and equitable at all levels of the education system.
- To achieve substantial, consistent increases in the percentage of GDP allocated to the Ministry of Education in order to reach the 7 percent established by the National Education Act, or at least the minimum 6 percent recommended by UNESCO (Prospectus of the Grand National Campaign 2002).

To date, there has been progress in:

- Conducting an annual social audit in a representative sample of schools throughout the country to quantitatively and qualitatively monitor and assess the support services of the Ministry of Education, the methodology used in the classroom, bilingual education, and other factors that influence learning. Annual reports of the results of the audit are prepared and released by means of wide dissemination.
- Organizing forums and discussions with experts to reflect on and raise awareness about educational conditions in order to develop concrete proposals that will help establish the necessary quality of education for Guatemala.
- Acting as an interlocutor and recognized mediator between the State agencies defining the country's educational policies and Guatemalan society.

To ensure the achievement of the objectives, the GCNPE is organized as follows:
• The Board of Directors is an honorary body that sets the GCNPE’s general agenda. It consists of ASIES and the rector of the University of Guatemala in San Carlos, the University Rafael Landívar, the University del Valle de Guatemala, and the University Mariano Gálvez.

• The General Assembly is the body that approves the actions and plans proposed. It is made up of the representatives of eighty member organizations, including members of the media, think tanks, NGOs focused on education, human rights, the environment, women, and indigenous peoples, and others.

• The Technical Group, an honorary body composed of deans of various faculties from the same universities represented on the Board of Directors, and delegates from UNICEF, Save the Children, Businesspeople for Education, HPP-USAID, and ASIES.

• The Technical Secretariat, led by ASIES. It must be pointed out that the current Minister of Education was the former head of the secretariat.

Work plans and proposals are developed and implemented in a collective, participatory manner and with the consensus of the members of the Grand Campaign and the agreement of society in general.

The proposals and reports are prepared in writing and submitted to the General Assembly, interested institutions, the public sector, and the media. Many of the GCNPE’s members present the results of studies and public policy proposals through newspaper commentaries in the opinion columns of various Guatemalan print media outlets.

During the 2007 elections, the group secured political commitment to change the conditions in which Guatemalan children and youth are educated. The result was a greater focus on education.

In 2011, again in the context of elections, the social audit was carried out on a national scale. It collected information on the updated status of the factors that influence learning: materials, methodology, bilingual education, teacher qualifications, actual time in spent in the classroom, parent involvement, and the relationship between parents, teachers, and school directors. The audit also measured first and third grade (primary school) students’ performance on standardized mathematics and language tests.

These results led the GCNPE to develop the National Agenda for Quality Education. The GCNPE led discussions and forums on each of the issues identified by the audit; the forums participants’ included experts, Technical Committee members, and members of the Grand Campaign. Furthermore, officials from the Ministry of Education participated as speakers at all the events. The proposal was also validated by members of the teams of each political party participating in the 2011 electoral process.

The result was a document for each proposed program which described the background, research findings, and proposal. These documents are publicly available on the ASIES website. Furthermore, a summary was printed the day of the presentation and distributed to members of academia, national and international experts, members of the Grand Campaign, and the Ministry of Education.
Additionally, a pamphlet summarizing each of the programs was printed for distribution during activities aimed at specific groups.

Since early 2012, the GCNPE has promoted the Proposed Municipal Agenda for Quality Education, which includes and is based on updated national data and municipality-specific indicators, and presents strategies and activities implemented in several municipalities which have had an impact on the educational process.

The strategy of influence

The GCNPE and ASIES exerted direct influence by targeting influential groups such as international agencies, universities, religious, business, and education organizations, the mass media, and especially political parties that may govern the country in the next administration. The public launches of GCNPE’s reports, especially in the case of the National Education Agenda, were always attended by the Minister of Education or a Deputy Minister. The Grand Campaign has maintained communication with the Ministry of Education.

The GCNPE also worked with the Ministry of Finance, the General Revenue Office, the Commission on Education, and the Board of Transparency of Congress to raise awareness about educational issues. Through which the possibility was discussed of decentralizing the allocation of the budget for the Ministry of Education on matters relevant to Organizations involving parents who collaborate in primary schools. The objective was to streamline the allocation of budgets and ensure that supplies (food, textbooks, stationery, didactic material, infrastructure repairs, and incidental expenses) arrived on time and were used transparently to achieve a quality education for Guatemalan students. Furthermore, countless television, radio, written interviews, and newspaper columns were used to raise the awareness of the mass media and press associations.

Impact

GCNPE contributed to the decision-making process by:


• Preparing nine annual Social Audit Reports from 2002–2009 and in 2011.

• Preparing and presenting the National Education Agenda, with short-, medium- and long-term goals and indicators for 2012–2020, aimed at society and particularly political parties.

• Facilitating dialogue and consensus to support the proposal to increase investment and coverage and quality of education proposed in the National Education Agenda.
• Persuading the Ministry of Education to adopt the National Education Agenda. The Ministry's work plan (strategic guidelines and targets), programs, and activities are evidence that it is acting on the changes proposed by the NEA. The month of April saw the publication of the Ministerial Agreement decentralizing the allocation of budgets, which is a key element proposed on the National Education Agenda aimed at improving spending efficiency.

The following are some of the factors favouring the impact:

• The growth of GCNPE as a result of the active participation of more universities and institutions and national and international organizations.

• The process of raising social awareness of issues since 1999.

• The opportunities for reflection and dialogue with key stakeholders, such as Congress and the Ministry of Education.

• In 2011, the Presidential Candidates forums were a window of opportunity for discussion of the proposal.

• Meetings with the governing party’s Education Committee as of this year.

• Meetings with the Minister and Vice Ministers of Education to discuss educational process issues and present reports on and proposed solutions to these problems.

• ASIES actively participates in the GCNPE at all levels. ASIES’s policy influence capacity and drawing power (ability to bring into the process diverse stakeholders, experts, and decision-makers), the experience of ASIES consultants and researchers in the field of education, and ASIES’s experience in starting, leading, and participating in networks were all factors that aided impact.

In the area of institutional capacities, this effort helped to:

• Develop greater drawing power.

• Have greater influence on shaping the public agenda.

• Strengthen the credibility of the social movement.

• Promote real and effective urban and rural citizen participation.

• Make the institution a leading figure in educational matters in the media and the general context.

Lessons learned

The following are some strategies that could have helped even further:
• Forums and discussions at the departmental level, i.e. decentralizing the call and implementing wider dissemination outside the capital.

• Presentation of reports and proposals on education in a Mayan language in the most densely populated departments of the republic where many speakers live.

• Individual meetings with public officials who make decisions at certain levels.

• Discussions with members of the Congressional Commission on Education

• Statements on different subjects in the print media, on radio, and television.

The following are some strategies that would not have helped:

• Reporting irregular situations without hard evidence.

• Questioning the use of the budget of the Ministry of Education without providing evidence or proposed solutions.

• Complaining about the negative influence of teachers’ unions promoting strikes and downtime in schools, giving the impression that dialogue is being avoided.
CADEP’s case: Informing Economic Reform in Paraguay

About CADEP

The Centro de Análisis y Difusión de la Economía Paraguaya (CADEP) is a nongovernmental organization with over twenty years of experience. Founded in June 1990, it is dedicated to capacity-building, carrying out research and studies, and producing publications on the economies and societies of various areas of Paraguay and the region. A center for independent thought with no ties to any universities, CADEP works in academic production, promotes capacity-building for economists and non-economists, and seeks to shape public opinion and influence economic policy.

International institutions and agencies fund CADEP’s research, studies, and publications. In the field of capacity-building, CADEP offers university diploma courses and runs a master’s program through a partnership with the Catholic University of Asunción. CADEP does not receive national funds, either from the public or private sector.

CADEP was set up shortly after the end of a long period of authoritarian rule in Paraguay. At the time, activities involving research in general and the social sciences in particular were virtually nonexistent. Publications were few and far between and international organizations rather than national institutions were the targets of the main research papers.

The first task of CADEP’s members was therefore to raise awareness of the significance of social science research and consequently spur the demand for research. External foundations and international cooperation agencies working to promote debate on the country’s major economic and social issues supported CADEP in this line of work. Thanks to CADEP’s independent nature, the national institution rather than international cooperation organizations established its research agenda.

As a result, CADEP’s work—based on implemented projects—gradually created a demand, first in the National Congress and then at the local government level. After working hard to promote research topics and proposals in various segments of public opinion, demands for research started coming from the Executive, which eventually invited CADEP members to participate as policymakers.

It must be pointed out that throughout this process, CADEP worked with the mass media to publicize its activities, the contents of its research, and the opinions of its members in the press, on the radio, and on television.

The areas in which CADEP works today are the result of different stages in the life of the institution. When CADEP was created, it was mainly concerned with macroeconomic policies and State reform, as these were central issues at the beginning the country’s democratic era. Paraguay’s decision to join MERCOSUR and the World Trade Organization in the mid-nineties led to the opening of a second theme: economic integration and foreign trade. CADEP’s consultancy work for the National Congress during those years – carried out in conjunction with the business sector and having the characteristics of

5 Center for the Analysis and Dissemination of the Paraguayan Economy.
Paraguay’s inclusion in globalization – led the organization to embark in research areas, such as employment and poverty and corporate competitiveness and development. Finally, an area dedicated to regional economic development was formed in order to understand the country’s asymmetrical economic growth and to explore the possibility of regional integration with Paraguay’s two big neighbors, Brazil and Argentina.

During its first ten years of existence, CADEP largely initiated its own research projects, studies, and technical consultancies based on what it considered to be the country’s most significant economic and social issues. The proposals were drawn up by professionals at the institution and submitted to international foundations, taking into special consideration these foundations’ agenda as a priority.

Over time, both multilateral and bilateral cooperation agencies began creating a demand for studies and research on issues that they considered relevant to the Latin American region. In response to this growing demand, CADEP began engaging in such research, always making sure to only take on topics that also aligned with its own research priorities.

The products of CADEP’s research and studies are abundant and varied. First, CADEP boasts a vast bibliographic production (books), written with the participation of both national and foreign researchers. Second, it has prepared many specific studies and working papers for discussions with academics as well as various economic and political stakeholders. Technical reports, policy notes, and study and research briefs were developed for specific consultancies with policymakers and social and economic stakeholders. Newspaper articles and research briefs in special sections of newspapers are still other products written and disseminated by CADEP. Manuals and booklets on specific topics are used to train various stakeholders in understanding the fundamentals of economic policies. In recent years, the creation of two policy watchdogs and the use of advanced information technologies and social networking websites (the Internet, Facebook, etc.) have offered new ways of communicating CADEP’s products.

Workshops and seminars aimed at both general and targeted audiences, lectures, and book and publication launches are outlets through which CADEP regularly disseminates its findings and knowledge production.

**Policy influence**

CADEP emerged at a time (1990) when there was no policy debate in Paraguay, after the fall of an authoritarian regime that had been in power for thirty-five years. CADEP was created as an independent entity with no ties to any national or external foundations or any specific economic or political group.

As efforts were made to present and secure projects funded mainly by foreign foundations and bodies, CADEP made its first foray into public policy when its founders started contributing weekly newspaper columns; these led to invitations to participate in radio and television debates.
CADEP also exerted influence by organizing informational and discussion meetings for senior public officials, business representatives, and academics. The idea was to create opportunities for serious dialogue and break down a number of prejudices between the public and private sectors in terms of economic policies.

In the mid-1990s, CADEP launched a publication consisting of opinion-based pieces and short articles addressing topical issues, with new, pioneering sections highlighting innovative business entrepreneurship and local government activities. This publication was released on a bimonthly basis for four years.

In the same period, as a result of one of its first projects, CADEP began advising National Congressional committees, which had remained virtually dormant during the authoritarian regime (1954–89). This highly-technical advisory work helped foster rich and thorough discussion of bills before they were passed. Of particular importance was CADEP’s role advising a bicameral committee on how to understand and manage the National General Budget, as it resulted in a closer relationship with the executive.

The policy influence work aimed at the Legislature lasted from 1994 to 1998; its greatest impact was on a project whose goal was the passage and enactment of laws on a priority legislative agenda. By the end of the project, nine laws had been passed and enacted that were essential for public policies to work in the country.

At the same time, CADEP started implementing projects involving local municipal governments, which had acquired budgetary and policy autonomy under the new Constitution passed in 1992. CADEP’s projects focused on the organization and management of several municipalities, the implementation of participatory budgets (citizen participation), and local level microenterprise production projects.

**An example of policy influence work**

The process of policy influence on the executive began in the late nineties with the publication of a book entitled *Los Límites de la Transición. Economía y Estado en el Paraguay en los Años Noventa* (The Limits of Transition. Economy and State in Paraguay in the Nineties). The work drew attention to an underdeveloped market and poor citizen participation as obstacles to reforming the State and the Paraguayan economy. The postponement of such reforms was said to have led to economic stagnation and increasing social exclusion and insecurity.

The success of this first publication established CADEP as a leading institution in the field of public policies in the country. This prompted the center to hold annual economic forums beginning in 1997. At these meetings, national and international experts in public policy issues presented papers that were later collected in the *Serie FECON* books, which were widely disseminated by CADEP. The Economic Forums were held until 2004.
The years CADEP devoted to studies and discussions on State reform and public policy eventually led to concrete policy proposals to the very heart of government administration: first, when the national government invited leading CADEP figures to participate in the development of a Government Plan in 1999, and later in 2003, when the President-elect designated CADEP’s director as Finance Minister, bringing most of the institution’s technical team to the government ranks with him. The contribution of the institution was twofold: a) promotion of debate on State reforms and b) implementation of policy recommendations that had emerged during the previous years of study, research, and dissemination.

The rise of a dubious government in 1999 following the resignation of the democratically-elected president after the Vice President’s assassination unleashed a serious political and institutional crisis. To make matters worse, the economy went into recession in 2000 and a nation-wide financial crisis broke out. In the international context, the Paraguayan government’s credibility had suffered greatly due to both the delay in meeting its debt commitments and the low implementation rate of projects funded through international cooperation.

In the context of these serious political and economic crises, a new government came to power that was both legitimate and willing to make changes, two qualities that had been missing in previous governments. This new government began its term by designing a government plan based on a diagnosis of the economic situation that outlined achievable short- and medium-term goals and outcomes. The administration demonstrated its serious attitude by putting together a technical rather than political cabinet and appointing ministers and secretaries from sectors outside the governing party.

CADEP’s technical team developed and proposed a package of reforms that sought to restore the country’s macroeconomic stability, provide the State with a greater financial capacity to meet its commitments, and contribute to a business climate that would pave the way for investment. Prior to the implementation of these reforms, the main economic stakeholders (businesspeople) and politicians in the country were urged to provide their support through signed agreements, lending these reforms greater legitimacy. The main measures to be taken included tax reform, public pension sector reform, a new customs code, state bank reform, a system of guarantees for savers, and a start to reforming state-run companies.

Not all these reforms were fully implemented, but some of the most pressing problems were solved by restoring economic growth, increasing revenues, achieving a fiscal surplus, and maintaining regular debt payment. Despite the signing of a standby agreement with the IMF to restore international trust and avoid a default, the adaptation of these reforms to the local reality and the non-literal implementation of external prescriptions made it possible to implement the changes without opposition from the affected sectors. Moreover, the example of previous agreements signed with the economic and political stakeholders was adopted by the IMF in later years as a condition in negotiating standby agreements with countries such as Guatemala and the Dominican Republic.
CADEP’s technical team’s term was two years (2003-2005). The new government elected in 2008 invited CADEP to form part of the team that would develop the government’s Economic and Social Plan; once again several of its members joined the State to work in top positions.

Internally, CADEP underwent a double-edged effects-and-learning process. On the one hand, the organization gained national and international prestige as a think tank, reinforced by the practical application of policy prescriptions advocated by the institution. However, its financial and human resources structure was institutionally weakened, which took a heavy toll on CADEP because it implied difficult restructuring and the recovery of key contacts to achieve continuity in project funding.

CADEP is currently implementing a new set of projects that seek to train and educate civil society organizations and the public on nationally important topics. The main idea of this new initiative is capacitate citizens and give them greater content when making demands to public authorities on various issues affecting the country’s social welfare and economic progress.
FOSDEH’s Case: Changing Rules for External Debt in Honduras
About Foro Social sobre la Deuda Externa y Desarrollo en Honduras (FOSDEH) 6

FOSDEH was founded in 1995, initially as a program within the Asociacion de Organismos No Gubernamentales (ASONO)7 that sought to analyze and address the issue of foreign debt and its impact on Honduras. The FOSDEH program questioned the way foreign debt had been managed historically by the Honduran State and represented the widely held view that its management ought not be the sole responsibility and mandate of the State since the burden of debt affects all Honduran citizens. Initially, in addition to the issue of foreign debt, FOSDEH also focused on poverty reduction and national reconstruction following the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.

FOSDEH was formally established as an NGO in 2005 and has sought to contribute to the design of macro- and micro-economic public policies that are based on social justice, equality, respect of human rights, and democracy, through research, training and awareness-raising. FOSDEH’s focus broadened from the analysis of foreign debt to include neo-liberal measures that were being rolled out in Honduras; the negotiation of bi-lateral and regional free trade agreements; and issues of transparency, poverty and social policy and monitoring. FOSDEH’s current research topics include public domestic debt, fiscal policy, the National General Budget, monetary policy, state investment, and their respective social impacts.

FOSDEH receives funding and technical backing from a number of international cooperation agencies which include ICCO, Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid, Diakonia, Oxfam, Trocaire, Counterpart, IDRC, IBIS and Irish Aid.

Political context
During the 1970s and 1980s, Honduras’ foreign debt balance grew rapidly, with the State being required to take out additional loans in order to service its existing foreign debt finance. By 1996, foreign debt had reached US$4,453 billion with the servicing of the repayments equaling a proportion of 29% of Honduran imports and 14% of national GDP. However, there was little transparency and debate surrounding the issue of Honduras’ indebtedness and whether additional foreign debt should be incurred (despite the initial borrowing having had little or no impact on the country’s development) since it was a private contractual matter limited to the creditors (mainly, the World Bank, IMF and Paris Club) and the debtor (the Honduran government). The burden of repayments on capital and interest on the foreign debt was such that the Honduran government was willing to enter into a process of negotiating debt relief, even if, paradoxically, it was reticent in renouncing taking on additional new loans.

The Honduran bishop Oscar Andres Rodriguez, then President of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), intervened in the debate of foreign indebtedness in Latin America which had reached

6 The Social Forum on Foreign Debt and Development in Honduras.
7 Association of Non-Governmental Organizations.
approximately US$600 billion in 1996. This intervention was to have a major influence on the modification of the structure and conditions of payment of the foreign debt finance in the region, and culminated with the Jubilee 2000 campaign which had as its central theme the waiving of foreign debt repayment obligations for “heavily indebted poor countries” (HIPC). Following the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the G-8 developed a process of debt relief for HIPC's tied to certain macro-economic requirements.

In the wake of Hurricane Mitch which devastated Honduras in 1998, the socio-economic impact was such that it enabled Honduras to be considered eligible for debt relief, reduction and restructuring processes, particularly in the HIPC initiative.

Proposal

FOSDEH was called upon to advise the government in the process of negotiating the debt relief between 1998-2001 and 2002-2006 due to its knowledge of the economics and the international process for debt relief for HIPC's. In effect, FOSDEH became a direct technical actor in the Honduran debt relief process, making submissions before the Government, as well as to various international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, whilst also ensuring dialogue and a bridge with national social organizations.

FOSDEH was able to initiate research to examine, document and inform on the issue of foreign debt in Honduras. In particular, between 2001 and 2005, FOSDEH's work focused on the Letter of Intent agreed between Honduras and the IMF and current and future perspectives relating to foreign debt in light of the debt cancellation process with the publication of:

1. a book on the Civil Challenge: Change the Letter of Intent agreed with the IMF (2001);
2. a working paper on three case studies and a testimony on the Letter of Intent agreed with the IMF (2002); and
3. a book on an Urgent Memorandum to Honduras: current situation and future prospects relating to the foreign debt situation... Beyond the debt release process (2005).

In particular, FOSDEH's work noted that:

1. Most of the debt incurred by the Honduran State (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, and to a lesser extent up to the 1990s) did not have the impact which had been hoped for, and was often subject to corruption which went unpunished;
2. The payment of capital and interest on the debt was unserviceable, particularly as new loans were accrued, which lead to the Government using funds destined for social areas such as education and health which was problematic in a country where it is estimated that two thirds of the population was living in poverty;
3. One of the strategies or forms of debt relief should be focusing on the redemption of the release of the debt payment through social investment in order to eradicate poverty (i.e. that the payments of the Government should be redirected towards local and regional development
projects) with a transversal component of civil participation, that is to say with the marginalized defining the priorities of the investment;

4. Policy measures would need to be developed as part of the wider strategy of indebtedness and debt relief in order to control internal and external debt, direct spending and public investment towards social development and generate regional development efforts with the new or released debt funds; and

5. Honduras needs a strategy of borrowing and debt relief set within a framework of national and regional development which differs from the classic centralist Honduran State logic in order to recalibrate the process from the local to the national (which had previously generated conflicts with the Government). This proposal would favor the de-concentration and decentralization of power and resources in order to create Regional Poverty Reduction Strategies.

To carry out research or implement a policy influence process, FOSDEH’s policy has always been to involve other social stakeholders (leaders of community-based organizations, NGO officials, etc.) in the research process. Consultation events aimed at extending or strengthening the objectives of the research are common practice, as is the use of interviews for the same purpose. Consultations with various social stakeholders are also held when validating the studies prior to their eventual publication.

**Strategies of influence**

From its inception, FOSDEH has traditionally adopted an indirect strategy of influence, that is to say, to act as a technical agency that uses inputs and analysis to empower various social stakeholders that have a direct influence on public policy and capacity for mobilisation from their respective fields. FOSDEH believes that this insulation from public authorities allows it more space to maintain its critical stance of the Government’s actions.

However, as noted above, in the early 2000s during the height of the Honduran debt relief process, FOSDEH modified its strategy of influence and instead became a direct technical interlocutor with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and an unpaid advisor to the Honduran government officials who were negotiating debt relief, whilst submitting proposals and making technical recommendations on the design of policy measures and the agenda of the debt relief process. In addition, it produced various working papers and books on the at the time current and future perspectives relating to foreign debt in light of the debt cancellation process.

FOSDEH maintains direct relationships with decision makers and uses analysis and technical proposals as effective tools for policy influence. However, its policy influence strategy also incorporates grassroots social groups with capacity to mobilize. In line with its policy influence strategy, its targets are grouped into two broad areas: decision makers and social organizations which in turn have a direct effect on the decision makers. Its strategy also includes municipal governments as "policy influence targets", as they are considered strategic allies of community-based organizations in their demands from the State. IFIs are also considered allies for their role at the national level.
The policy influence channels favoured by FOSDEH are meetings, workshops and forums, as well as wide dissemination of the materials it constantly produces, such as the newsletter "Otra Mirada", which is published every two months, the use of its website, email, and different social networks.

Unlike most NGOs headquartered in the capital, FOSDEH holds meetings and maintains contact nodes in various parts of the country, which enhances its influence. As regards engaging municipal governments, rather than through lobbying, this is carried out by incorporating local authorities into the training workshops held in the regions.

The country’s mass media also play a pivotal role in the policy influence strategy. FOSDEH is considered an important source of information, and as such gives an estimated three interviews a day to journalists seeking an objective opinion on the government’s economic affairs. The attention given by the national, local and even international press is in turn coupled with press conferences, discussions on specific topics, press releases, and support for research topics promoted by the press, among others. However, FOSDEH only seeks to use the media as a way to inform and create awareness through press releases and articles rather than use it as a direct channel of influence.

The direct impact strategy of influence outlined above contributed to FOSDEH’s ability to impact this area of public policy. It is also worth emphasizing that FOSDEH’s successful intervention in the debt relief process owed much to FOSDEH’s reputation and FOSDEH’s expert knowledge in the field of foreign debt and international debt relief processes, having lead the way as a civil society institution to place the issue of debt relief on the political agenda and intervene in the design of the debt relief measures and the financing of a poverty reduction strategy (Estrategia de Reduccion de la Pobreza (ERP)).

**Impact**

Initially, Honduras did not meet all the requirements necessary to accede to the HIPC debt relief process. However, through the Honduran Government’s efforts, with technical support from FOSDEH, certain parameters were amended in order to take into account the realities of Honduras’ economy which allowed it to join the HIPC debt relief process. Ultimately, the main debt cancellations for Honduras were successfully negotiated and agreed under the HIPC debt relief process in 2005.

However, while FOSDEH and the Government both agreed on the need of debt relief, the Government did not support FOSDEH’s proposal that Honduras’ regions and municipalities should be given control of the implementation of development projects funded by the debt swap release obtained once Honduras had completed the HIPC debt relief process managed by the World Bank.

In particular, throughout the HIPC debt relief process, FOSDEH made:

1. Recommendations relating to the timing of the debt relief process and agenda setting; and
2. Technical recommendations on the design of policy measures, in particular the conditions under which each relief initiative was being negotiated and how the forgiven resources should be used.

As Honduras began the process of acquiring debt relief, particularly under the HIPC initiative, it was planned that the debt swap funds would finance the ERP. FOSDEH played a critical role in designing this ERP through various consultations in different regions of the country. However, FOSDEH was effectively marginalized from taking part in the implementation of the ERP or even commenting on this process by the Government. As a consequence, FOSDEH has had to renounce participating in such forums as the Civil Society Advisory Council responsible for ensuring the correct application of the ERP (Consejo Consultivo de la Sociedad Civil encargado de velar por la correcta aplicación de la ERP (CCSC-ERP)).

FOSDEH considers that the release of approximately $5,000 million worth of foreign debt was a success, but ultimately was a wasted opportunity due to the fact that:

1. The conversion of debt was not used to finance a strategy which could overcome poverty and inequality or finance strategic investments; rather it was mainly used to finance current static Government expenditure (eg. civil service salary payments); and
2. The implementation of the ERP did not respect the principle of devolved power towards the municipalities and regions; rather it was ineffectively and weakly administered by the CCSC-ERP in a centralized and discretionary manner.

As to the factors that favored FOSDEH’s intervention and the impact of its work, it is worth reiterating the following:

1. The repayments of the capital and interest on the existing foreign debt were such that the Government was willing to contemplate engaging in a process of debt relief;
2. Cardinal Rodriguez’s intervention in the debate of foreign indebtedness in Latin America and the launch of the Jubilee 2000 campaign were instrumental in drawing national and international attention to the issue of debt relief;
3. The socio-economic impact of Hurricane Mitch enabled Honduras to be considered eligible for debt relief, reduction and restructuring processes, particularly in the HIPC initiative; and
4. FOSDEH’s reputation and expert knowledge in the field through its previous efforts to bring sectors of civil society to address the issue of foreign debt and its impact on Honduras meant that it was well placed to directly intervene and provide direct technical support in the debt relief and restructuring process.

**Looking back**

On reflection, FOSDEH believes that the following could have been performed more emphatically and could have caused changes at a different level:

1. More sustained and deeper processes with members of Congress.
2. Improvement of internal systematization processes for the work undertaken for more evidence of FOSDEH’s contributions to policy-making and implementation.

In light of the sometimes strained and mistrustful relations with the Government during the debt relief negotiation process, despite FOSDEH providing direct technical support to the process, it appears fundamental to work at ensuring a neutral and cordial relationship with Government, whilst ensuring independence and the ability to critique is maintained. This, in combination, with the two factors of possible change identified above, could perhaps have ensured that FOSDEH was able to participate with the implementation of the ERP.
FUNDAUNGO’s Case: Participation Policies at the Local Level in El Salvador

About FUNDAUNGO

The Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO) was established on January 8, 1992 as a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to contribute to the democratic development of El Salvador in order to improve the quality of life of the population in a context of participation in and expansion of economic, social, and political opportunities.

FUNDAUNGO is a think tank that generates and disseminates knowledge concerning issues of national and Central American interest, conducts studies and research, creates opportunities for reflection and influence, and provides capacity-building and technical assistance services. It conducts its work through three programs:

- Democratic governance
- Territorial management and citizens
- Public policy studies

Funding for its activities comes from the implementation of projects and the sale of consulting services to international organizations and government institutions at the national and local levels.

The political context of demand

FUNDAUNGO’s policy influence success story is a public policy proposal at the local government level, one of the administration levels at which the Foundation conducts its work. The project began in October 2001, when the City Council of the Municipality of Chalchuapa agreed to conduct a study on the state of citizen participation in local government management.

In April 2002, the City Council again called a number of public meetings to obtain the views of the population on the performance of participation mechanisms. These efforts were part of an informal municipal policy for building and promoting citizen participation channels. The City Council eventually appointed a citizen participation committee tasked with preparing a draft of a formal policy.

The committee received technical advice from the Dr. Guillermo Ungo Foundation. The Foundation’s ideas were incorporated into the municipal policy that was finally adopted on September 5, 2002 in a regular session of the Chalchuapa City Council.

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8 Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation.
9 Some of these efforts were, for instance, that between 1997 and 1998, when a participatory investment plan was developed for 1998-2003, accompanied by a local development committee made up of residents of the Municipality.
El Salvador is divided into three regions (Western, Eastern and Central), which in turn are divided into 14 departments composed of 262 municipalities. The Municipality of Chalchuapa is part of the Department of Santa Ana, in the Western Region of the country, famous for having been one of the largest Mayan cities and therefore considered an important cultural area. Furthermore, at the political level, the municipality of Chalchuapa has been run by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) for the last four terms.

It is also necessary to consider that at that time, administrative law did not require municipalities to provide access to public information or implement mechanisms of accountability or citizen participation in municipal planning. These regulations were made part of national legislation through various laws enacted or amended between 2005 and 2010.

The proposal

The project, entitled “Política de participación ciudadana en la gestión del gobierno municipal de Chalchuapa”\(^\text{10}\), seeks to create a framework for assessing and enhancing citizen participation in local government and public affairs. The aim of the project was to create a suitable framework for citizen participation in public affairs, making sure there was the necessary respect for local civil society to develop their own partnership and management practices while creating explicit, clear, and functional channels to create a link with the municipal government. The objective of the policy was "to establish a set of conditions that will ensure citizen participation in public affairs within the municipality’s jurisdiction." The principles of universality, equality, respect for dissent, accountability, transparency, and gradualism were central to this goal.

The following is a summary of the main elements of the proposal:

- In order to facilitate citizen participation with certainty and within the context of the management areas, the municipality will work on institutionalizing its processes so that they occur in accordance with clearly defined procedures, incorporate instruments contemplating the different forms of effective citizen participation, and are supported by efforts to create an environment that will make them comprehensible.

- Any municipal planning processes that occur will aim for citizen participation at all stages: participatory diagnoses, citizen proposals for solutions and potential projects, formulation of project selection criteria, prioritization of projects and services, and implementation programming.

- Any ordinances, municipal regulations, and agreements that have implications for the general public or specific groups will be defined and implemented by means of a process involving the participation of the interested people at the various stages: initiative, development, implementation, dissemination, and assessment.

\(^{10}\) “Policy on Citizen Participation in the Management of the Municipal Government of Chalchuapa”
• The performance of the municipal services and their outreach require the expansion of facilities to reassure the citizens that the corresponding procedure will be implemented when they manage the aforementioned services.

• Responsible and transparent use of resources and the understanding of the results of the municipal management of resources are matters of public interest, so adequate information and public scrutiny should be encouraged in these practices.

• In recognition of the significance of citizen participation, the municipality will promote changes in its structure and capacities so that the municipal system can make a transition to a participatory style of management.

• The municipality will make efforts to strengthen social organizations and train individuals involved in citizen participation organizations.

The proposal was presented in the context of the “Programa Democracia y Desarrollo Local”\(^\text{11}\) as part of the area of work called “Promoción de la Participación Ciudadana en la Gestión del Gobierno Local”.\(^\text{12}\) The initiative was tripartite, with the participation of the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (FUNDAUNGO), the Chalchuapa City Council, and the support of CREA Internacional de El Salvador/USAID. They signed a cooperation agreement on the participatory creation of a Local Action Policy and Plan.

**Policy influence strategies**

The prevailing policy influence strategy is direct, since it involves participation in the committee drafting the project. This led to an exercise in awareness, training, and dialogue with people and organizations involved in decision-making.

At the local level, policy influence involved three levels. First, the traditional decision-making bodies in local government, the Mayor’s office and the City Council; second, indirect policy influence through local organizations in the area, such as community development associations, as well as church and NGO representatives; and finally, local State authorities that promote municipal strengthening processes, like the Salvadoran Institute for Municipal Development and others.

In addition, the diagnoses made were used to provide timely, adequate, and convincing information and solid, reliable arguments on the state of participation in decision-making. On another front, a citizenship training process was started which aimed to raise awareness of the importance and benefits of democratic participation in decision-making and presented experiences showcasing the feasibility of policy measures.

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\(^{11}\) Democracy and Local Development Program.

\(^{12}\) Promoting Citizen Participation in Local Government Management.
FUNDAUNGO used its research and training strengths to promote a policy influence strategy based on an awareness and capacity-building effort aimed at citizen and local government stakeholders. It also interwove other initiatives to promote the dissemination of the resulting policy and ordinance and support the implementation of some of their elements.

The impacts of supply

The main impact that was achieved was the adoption of the “Política de participación ciudadana en la gestión del gobierno municipal de Chalchuapa” and the enactment of the Ordinance for Citizen Participation. This has helped create a local legal framework for better management of the local government in line with the views of the people, municipal planning that involves citizens at all stages, and the possibility of having municipal ordinances, regulations, and agreements. In addition, the responsible and transparent use of municipal resources by promoting adequate access to information and public scrutiny in local government decisions.

As for the project’s impact on FUNDAUNGO, the following elements can be pointed out:

- The Foundation’s staff improved its understanding of citizen participation, public transparency, and municipal policy influence processes.
- The organization improved its position in the area of local democratic governance and strengthened its research agenda on related issues.
- The results of this and other local-level experiences helped the Foundation make contributions to the national debate on reforms to the Municipal Code, which has regulated aspects of citizen participation and municipal transparency since 2005.

Among the factors facilitating this development, the following have been identified: 1) the City Council’s political will and its openness to participation; 2) the local leaders’ willingness and participation in workshops and other activities; 3) support from the Department of Public Welfare of the Municipality and 4) close coordination with the other cooperating institutions that sponsored the project.

In hindsight, the experience could have strengthened its scope and depth of application if two monitoring tools had been installed: 1) a set of performance indicators for the implementation of the policy (people receiving public information, participating communities, regulation instruments that are developed or modified with citizen participation), and 2) a citizen supervision body trained to monitor the implementation of the new framework by the different governments in power.
EEA’s Case: Revenue Potential Estimation and Gap Analysis in Ethiopia

About EEA

The Ethiopian Economics Association (EEA) is a nonpartisan and non-profit organization established under Ethiopian law in 1991, with the primary objective of contributing to the economic advancement of the country. The EEA seeks to establish itself as the premier economic association in Africa, and to be recognized and renowned for its excellence in membership services and economic policy research. Accordingly, it aims to promote the professional interests of its members and to contribute to economic policy formulation and implementation through sound policy research. Additional EEA objectives include creating public dialogue forums for the discussion of economic issues, assisting students and professors of economics at higher learning institutions in the country, and promoting professional contact among Ethiopian economists and their counterparts from other nations.

The EEA established the Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI) as its research, publication, and training arm in July 2000. The EEPRI is the first independent economic policy research think tank in Ethiopia. The Institute has adopted the following major objectives: (i) strengthen research capacity and establish an independent policy analysis center to provide continuous information and analysis on economic policy matters, (ii) collect and compile macroeconomic and sectorial data in a manner that allows rigorous empirical research on the Ethiopian economy, (iii) improve the policy environment through informed public debate and foster public participation in policy issues, (iv) increase options available to the government in making economic policy decisions, and (v) contribute to the development of the Ethiopian economy by providing quality, policy-relevant research that may be disseminated to all stakeholders in the Ethiopian economy.

The research and training activities of the Association are organized under four major thematic areas: macroeconomics, agriculture and natural resource management, trade and industry, and poverty and social sector issues. Since the establishment of EEPRI, the EEA has been able to undertake several research projects that have made a significant impact on the country’s policy-making process. In addition, the Institute has developed sufficient experience and success in handling extensive urban and rural surveys of various types. These surveys included sample sizes as large as eight thousand households and were undertaken throughout all regions of the country.

The research outputs of EEPRI have become important sources of analytical information for policymakers, donors and the general public. They have contributed directly to policy debates as well as to the formulation and implementation of economic policies in the country. EEPRI’s research findings have improved the quality of policy debate and helped to sharpen public policy intervention. The various capacity-building activities of EEPRI have also directly impacted skill formation.

Policymakers and other stakeholders are increasingly recognizing the critical role the EEA—and its research and training wing, the EEPRI—play in advancing the country’s economic development. These important advancements have been accomplished through research, short-term trainings, and the organization of public dialogue forums. As a result, the EEA has received several demand-driven
research projects from federal and regional governments. While the EEPRI has undertaken several research projects in response to these demands, only one recently completed research project is presented and discussed here. The study discussed below highlights the ways in which the EEA is being valued within the policy-making machinery and demonstrates how this valuable research has begun to shape national and regional policies.

**Political context of the research project**

This research project was undertaken in response to a request by the Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s (SNNP) Regional State, one of the nine regional states that constitute the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has embarked on a new development trajectory, to be guided by the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), a five-year development plan scheduled for implementation between 2010–11 and 2014–15. The GTP intends to improve the lives of the Ethiopian people and to reduce inequalities in all dimensions of well-being. This plan differs from previous programs because of the greater emphasis given to industrial development, rather than a focus on agriculture. The GTP emphasizes laying the foundation needed to enable the industrial sector to take the lead in the economic and social transformation of the country. More importantly, the plan takes infrastructural development as a priority, with particular emphasis on developments in the road, railway, and energy subsectors. Ethiopia endeavors to become a middle income country by around 2015, and the GTP envisages an average GDP growth of 11 percent per annum for the plan period to ensure this goal is met.

One of the critical challenges of this plan is the mobilization of the necessary financial resources to implement the proposed development projects. According to the plan, a total of 569.2 billion Birr (approximately USD 35 billion) would be required to finance the various projects outside the government budget. This figure is in addition to the normal government budget, which is estimated to be around 615.6 billion Birr (USD 37 billion). Moreover, a significant portion of the revenue (86 percent) is expected to come from domestic sources, primarily domestic tax revenue. The federal government has intensified its effort to increase domestic tax revenue through various means, and regional governments are also expected to follow this model. To that effect, the SNNP has made a commitment to improve and enhance its domestic revenue mobilization capacity. One way the region can improve its revenue generating capacity is to determine the revenue potential of the region through sound and credible research. The regional government is convinced that its revenue collection efforts should be guided and based on reliable information.

**Proposal**

The SNNP Regional State (“the Region”) constitutes about 10 percent of the total area of the country. It is also one of the most resource-rich regions in Ethiopia. However, measured by the ratio of tax collection as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or by tax-to-regional budget, the Region’s performance is very low and will decline over time. The average regional tax revenue-to-regional GDP ratio has been estimated to be only 1.7 for the last five fiscal years (2005–2010). This is far less than the national and sub-Saharan countries’ tax-to-GDP ratio, which is 10 percent and 18 percent, respectively.
Moreover, the regional tax-to-budget ratio declined from 13.4 percent in 2005 to 12.9 percent in 2010. The evidence also indicates that about 84 percent of the region’s budget is subsidized by the federal government. The remaining 13 percent comes from non-tax revenues.

The region’s very low tax mobilization effort requires critical attention. Currently measured in two ways, (i) by the proportion of tax-to-GDP ratio and (ii) by the increasing demand for state-run development endeavors with high dependency on federal government subsidy, the regional government felt that this situation should be reversed, and that any major policy change at the regional level should be based on a carefully designed study. This belief urged the regional state to conduct research on the revenue potential of the region, identify the tax gap, and take appropriate measures. As a result, the regional Bureau of Revenue Authority requested that the Ethiopian Economics Association undertake the proposed study. The analysis and findings of the study are intended to provide a starting point for regional tax policy discussion and revision.

The Bureau requested the Ethiopian Economic Association to undertake this study primarily due to the EEA’s high credibility and reputation for competence. The EEA is now recognized as a leading think tank that produces high quality studies in the fields of economic and social development. The Bureau had previously tried to use the service of a foreign consultant for the same assignment, but that approach was unsuccessful, as the study did not meet the Bureau’s expected quality standards. The Federal Revenue and Customs Authority also recommended the EEA for this work.

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- Assess and determine the revenue potential of the region at different administrative levels, such as zones, woredas (districts) and major towns;
- Identify the tax gap in the region under the existing national and regional tax laws;
- Assess the efficacy of the tax administration system of the region;
- Recommend possible mechanisms to narrow the tax gap and increase tax revenues from potential sources; and
- Improve the legal and tax administration system.

The proposal was presented on two occasions. First, to a group of experts from the different regional bureaus and then to another expert group from the Federal Revenue and Customs Authority. The discussion yielded very useful feedback. The proposal was also presented at a regional conference to solicit ideas from a wider audience of regional residents. Conference participants included people from academia, civil society organizations, and the private sector, and again resulted in many useful comments.

The study used both primary and secondary data collected from 134 woredas and 22 administrative towns, along with information obtained from other relevant regional and zonal administrative (sectorial)
offices. The research also reviewed federal-level laws and the experiences of other countries. Research methods included a combination of literature and policy document reviews, as well as interviews with relevant policymakers and economic actors in the region. Both descriptive and analytical approaches were followed to analyze the collected quantitative and qualitative data. Several field workers were mobilized, with close supervision, to collect information based on structured and unstructured questionnaires from each woreda and municipal town.

**Major Results of the Study**

The study generated useful results, which revealed huge, untapped revenue potential in the region and aroused interest among other regions to undertake similar studies. More specifically, the results show that the region can mobilize ETB 2.3 billion (more than USD 130 million) in 2009–10 Ethiopian fiscal year alone, and is predicted to increase to ETB 2.9 billion (more than USD 165 million) by the end of the 2011–12 fiscal year under the existing tax laws and regulations (base case scenario). The ensuing tax gap is estimated to be ETB 1.1 billion (about USD 63 million) and ETB 1.4 billion (more than USD 80 million) for 2009–10 and 2011–12, respectively.

The research also assessed the gap within the existing tax law and determined that there is room for improvement. In particular, the study revealed that the existing tax rate levied on the agricultural sector (the major economic activity in the region) is not optimal. If the region revises its existing tax laws, the study predicts that the total revenue potential of the region could reach ETB 3.4 billion (nearly USD 200 million) and ETB 4 billion (nearly USD 230 million) in the 2009–10 and 2011–12 Ethiopian fiscal years, respectively. The potential tax revenue-to-RGDP ratio, which is 5.9 percent for the base case scenario, would be raised to 9.3 percent in the proposed tax law revision.

Lack of reliable and up-to-date data has been a serious constraint during this study, underscoring the fact that the recording, systematization, and accuracy of data need serious consideration. Collecting more accurate and reliable data is crucial, in order to correctly determine the tax potential of the region. Based on these findings, the study proposed the following two major recommendations:

- Because the lack of reliable data is a serious limitation to the design of appropriate polices, the region may wish to implement appropriate initiatives to create a system where reliable data is collected by all sectors.

- An institutionalized, progressive tax system—particularly on the agricultural sector, with due affirmative considerations for the poorest segment of the population—would serve to close the huge gap between the tax revenues the region is currently able to collect and the potential tax revenues available to the region under a revised system.

**Strategy of Influence**

While this particular project has been a demand-driven collaborative work, the EEA also undertakes several other self-initiated projects every year. Since one of the main objectives of EEA is to support the policy making and implementation process in the country as a whole, it collaborates with both federal
and regional level offices on various projects, in addition to its core program activities. It is not the EEA’s policy to approve all such requests, as some requests may potentially compromise its core program activities. In general, in order to disseminate the results of the research projects to policymakers and other stakeholders, with the goal of informing future policy, the EEA uses several approaches. These dissemination strategies include organizing workshops and distributing publications and press releases.

However, with regard to this particular study, the research project was initiated and directly requested by the regional government. Therefore, the EEA did not have to organize a separate dissemination workshop or publish the results of this project. Since the regional government initiated the research idea, the findings have been directly used as input to inform policy. Because regional bureau staff and workers from the at zonal, woreda, and keble (the lowest administrative units in Ethiopia) levels were involved in the process from inception to the culmination of the final product, there is a high probability that the results of the study will inform and influence the mindset of the policymakers at various levels. At each stage of the research project, consultation workshops were organized with a group of experts drawn mostly from the Regional State Bureau of Revenue and Bureau of Finance and Economic Development. Selected staff from the Bureau of Revenue received specialized training to build their skill capacity, with the hope they will retain these skills for future assignments. The regional Bureau of Revenue has indicated that it will like to publish the study’s findings and distribute them to a wider audience, both within and outside the region.

The findings of the research were finally presented to and endorsed by the Regional Cabinet, which is composed of all Regional Bureau heads, the vice president, and the president of the Regional State. All the members of the cabinet, including the regional president, have appreciated the study and assured the EEA that they would like to see the continuation of similar support. Press releases and media coverage were also organized, to ensure that all major stakeholders in the region were informed about the results of the study.

**Impact on policy**

Although the study was completed very recently, in May 2011, already we have begun to observe the adoption of policy and administrative measures, based on the recommendations of the study. More specifically, the following measures have been adopted so far, based on feedback from the regional Bureau of Revenue:

- The Bureau of Revenue has already consulted the study findings when preparing the 2011–12 plan. The Bureau has set annual revenue targets for each woreda and administrative town based on its revenue generating potential as identified by the research;

- The results of the study have been used by the Bureau of Revenue for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) purposes. The biannual M&E process compares the amount of revenue collected during each period against annual agreed-upon targets and estimated revenue potential;
• The Bureau of Finance and Economic Development has also used the revenue potential estimates to set the regional annual revenue target, which is declared as part of the annual regional government budget;

• The Bureau of Revenue has also started using the results of the study for its Tax Payers Awareness Creation activities; and

• As recommended by the study, the Bureau of Revenue has undertaken administrative measures aimed at reorganizing human resources.

The impact of the study is also being observed beyond the Regional State. As per the request of the Federal Revenue and Custom Authority, the study has been presented at a national workshop, with representatives from all of the regional Bureaux of Revenue in attendance. The workshop also attracted officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, the Bureaus of Regional Finance and Economic Development and others. Several media reports have quoted the results of the study, and the study has aroused additional interest from national and regional governments who desire to undertake their own revenue potential assessments (even the federal government). The Amhara National Regional State and the Afar Regional State have both shown interest in our research, and the Federal Revenue and Custom Authority has signed a Memorandum of Understanding that will establish the framework for future collaboration in research, training and advisory services.

There may be several ways think tanks in different countries could engage policymakers, based on each country’s local policy environment. Although there are still some formidable challenges to be overcome, the role of think tanks in providing policy research and analysis is gradually being recognized by policymakers in Ethiopia. If think tanks really want to inform policymakers, the approach followed in this study is useful within the Ethiopian policy environment. Since 2009, civil society organizations have been operating in a slightly difficult and restrictive environment in Ethiopia. A law enacted in 2009 prohibits charities and societies who receive more than 10 percent of their resources from outside the country from engaging in certain activities such as advocacy work, so engaging the policymakers directly is quite useful.

Looking Back

While this is one example where the support of the Ethiopian Economics Association has been directly requested by the policymakers themselves, the EEA does initiate and undertake its own projects independently, with the aim of informing policy. The success of such independently initiated projects in influencing policy depends on the nature of the project. Some projects may be extremely sensitive, and policymakers may not be willing to readily endorse the project’s recommendations. Nevertheless, through persistent efforts, it is possible to gradually change the mindset of policymakers. One example supporting this belief is the Land Tenure study that the EEA undertook. Although many people felt that the land tenure system was one of the constraining factors of agricultural development, there has not been much discussion on the land tenure system in Ethiopia, since land is a constitutional issue. In response to this debate, the EEA organized a large survey of farm households and other actors in the
sector. The result of this study, which was published both in English and Amharic (the national language), was widely and freely distributed and was very much debated and discussed, even within the government circle. It is believed that this study had at least three major outcomes: (i) the study marked the beginning of a new relationship between the EEA and senior government officials; (ii) the government officially ceased the redistribution of land that caused land fragmentation; and (iii) the government recognized the fact that tenure security is important and implemented the Land Certification and Registration Program, a big program designed to ensure tenure security.
IEA’s Case: Setting Rules for Presidential Transitions in Ghana

About IEA

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) was founded in Ghana in 1989 as an independent public policy think tank at a time when Ghana was still under military rule and suffered from a lack of policy debate. The focus of the IEA is informed by its mission to promote good governance, democracy and a free market economy. IEA believes that an environment in which economic, social, political, and legal institutions function openly and freely is the key to sustainable economic growth and human development. The research work of the IEA is undertaken by its two Centres - an Economic Centre and a Governance Centre. The Institute receives funding from a variety of donors, as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The policy context of this study, the Presidential (Transition) Bill, is placed at the national level of government and falls squarely within the Governance Centre’s area of work on institutional reform.

Political context

Ghana’s current standing as an African success story owes much to its ability to change governments through the ballot box. Since the return to multiparty democracy in 1993, the country has held successive free and fair elections, which have resulted in two changes in government. Paradoxically, the changes in government have exposed serious shortcomings in the country’s institutional framework of governance. In fact, owing to a history of military coups since independence, the change in government in 2001 was the first time in Ghana’s history when political power was transferred from one democratically elected president to another democratically elected president. In that transition, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) led by Jerry Rawlings handed power to John Kufuor’s New Patriotic Party (NPP). The 2001 transition, however, was characterized by administrative lapses and conflict, which led to accusations of theft, the seizure of vehicles and forced evictions of the outgoing administration officials from state accommodations. The absence of a transition blueprint played a significant part in the resulting confusion, which created intense inter-party tensions, contributed to a hostile political environment and threatened Ghana’s democratic and economic gains.

In the context of a political climate that was increasingly seen as negatively polarized, the IEA Governance Centre initiated research to examine the perceived polarization of politics in Ghana. The IEA research paper on this issue confirmed the view that the country was indeed polarized and that this polarization manifested itself at the national level and between political parties. The paper identified the problems associated with the 2001 Transition as one of the main causes of inter-party tensions, especially between the then-ruling NPP and the opposition NDC. As a result, the research paper strongly recommended the establishment of a multi-partisan set of guidelines to govern future transitions.

Proposal

As part of efforts to ensure that the research recommendations were translated into policy, the IEA organized a workshop under its Ghana Political Parties Programme (GPPP) to discuss the proposals
made in the paper. It is worth mentioning that as part of its broader strategy to promote buy in and acceptance of its research recommendations, the Institute provides a platform for the leadership of Parliamentary Political Parties to discuss pertinent issues confronting Ghana. In terms of how the GPPP works, the political parties and the IEA meet once a month to discuss pressing policy issues, which usually stem from the IEA’s research outputs. The Institute engages the party leadership throughout the policy research process in order to obtain ownership on recommended solutions. This approach promotes consensus and makes the adoption and implementation of the Institute’s recommendations fairly straightforward.

After considering the bases on which the transition guidelines should be established (as outlined in the IEA research paper), political party leaders agreed that instead of guidelines to govern future transitions, enforceable legislation was needed. In response, the IEA Governance Centre carried out further comprehensive policy research to develop a detailed framework for the transition of governments. The product of this work was a draft Bill to govern future transitions.

After the initial draft Bill was completed, the IEA adopted a broader consultative approach in its efforts to validate the proposed law. In this respect, two workshops were organized. Key stakeholders and representatives of all registered political parties were invited. At these workshops, wide-ranging discussions among the leadership of political parties and representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) took place; suggestions for modifications to the draft Bill were taken into account in the subsequent revisions to the draft Bill.

The primary objective of the Presidential (Transition) legislation is to provide a framework for managing the transfer of political power from an outgoing democratically elected president to the new incoming president. Indeed, this framework is crucial to the creation of a stable environment necessary for economic development. While the Bill sought to address a range of problems identified in the previous transitions, its benefits transcended regime change. The cornerstone of the legislation is accountability; when implemented, it will herald a new era of institutional clarity in many aspects of public administration. This is particularly so with a new body to be established under this legislation—the Presidential Estates Unit (PEU). The PEU is charged with maintaining and keeping an inventory of executive assets. The Unit is to be headed by an independent Administrator-General, who will be appointed by the president in consultation with the Council of State, an advisory body of eminent citizens. In fact, the role of the Administrator-General, who is also responsible to facilitate the transition process, fills a long-standing vacuum. The transitional duties taken up by the Administrator-General would allow an incoming administration to focus on core governance issues, as opposed to pursuing outgoing government officials for state assets. The clear timeline set for Ministers to vacate their official accommodation is another provision which could help limit accusations of political witch-hunts when a change in government occurs. The transition legislation also provides an orderly process for resolving transition-related disagreements; it provides for the establishment of an Advisory Council, composed of three eminent citizens, who are tasked to resolve transition disputes.
Rather uniquely, the provisions of the draft Presidential Transition Bill had the benefit of being tested following the 2008 elections when there was a change in government from the NPP to the NDC. In fact, with no legislative framework in place to guide the transition team after the NDC won back power, the terms of the Bill were used as a guideline (albeit lacking the force of law). This served not only to assist the transition team but also identified issues requiring attention within the Bill. At the end of this transition process in 2009, the lessons drawn from the period were incorporated in the final draft of the Bill.

Overall, the evolution of the draft Presidential (Transition) Bill involved an elaborate consultative process—commencing a study, reviewing findings, making recommendations, participating in discussions, drafting and validating the bill, and re-drafting—over the course of a year and a half. At the completion of the final draft, the Bill was forwarded to government and subsequently to Parliament. After extensive debate, Parliament passed the Transition legislation in March 2012 and the new law has received presidential assent.

Strategies of influence

The IEA adopted a multipronged strategy involving a range of actors to achieve the successful passage of the Presidential (Transition) Legislation. Broadly, these can be categorized into four main strategies of influence. First, the fact that the IEA is the organizing body of the GPPP puts the Institute in a privileged position, in terms of being able to work directly with policy makers on national issues. Primarily, this has been achieved by working with political party leadership—in particular the Party Chairmen and General Secretaries—to gain consensus on policy issues stemming mainly from IEA Research. As part of its strategy, the IEA organized a meeting between party leaders and President John Evans Atta Mills in July 2009, six months after he was sworn into office. (This meeting took place after the president had initially committed to the Bill in his 2009 State of Nation Address). The Institute used the occasion to lobby for the prompt passage of the Transition Bill.

The key to GPPP’s success has been the IEA’s independence. The Institute strictly guards its independence. In all its work, the IEA seeks to find a balance between maintaining the collective confidence of all parties while also acting as an organization that is prepared to engage in robust policy debate. This approach certainly helped to gain consensus and ensure unanimous support for the passage of the Presidential (Transition) Law.

The second strategy of influence used by the IEA was direct engagement with the Members of Parliament on the Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee, the group charged with considering the legislation. In this regard, in May 2011 the IEA facilitated a capacity-building workshop for the Committee members to help build their knowledge and understanding of the proposed law. Significantly, the workshop served as an additional working session of the Committee, who scrutinized the Bill clause by clause. Additionally, issues raised on various provisions, as well the language of the Bill, were addressed by experts engaged by the IEA. This session was the Committee’s final deliberation
on the Bill. Overall, the workshop allowed the Committee members to gain further insight into the legislation and certainly fast-tracked its consideration.

Ghana’s vibrant media was used as a third strategic tool of influence. IEA used print and electronic media extensively in order to galvanize public awareness and support for the proposed law. The Institute’s policy analyst, for example, wrote opinion editorials and feature articles in leading Ghanaian newspapers throughout the duration of the legislative cycle. This led to a snowball effect, as other media outlets subsequently picked up the issues raised and requested interviews to discuss the proposed law. This was particularly the case with radio stations, which tend to have a wide listening audience and remain influential in Ghana. There were also live televised debates on leading current affairs programs, where IEA representatives and senior officials of the NDC and NPP came together to discuss the Bill. Text messages and phone-in views received during these media encounters indicated that the public took an interest in the proposed law and viewed the need to establish a framework to guide the transition process as essential to its success.

The fourth strategy the IEA utilized to influence the passage of the Transition Law was through publications—booklets, policy briefs and press releases. From the onset, the IEA ensured that detailed material was available to inform policymakers and the public on the proposed law. To this effect, in 2008 the Institute published the draft booklet 'Presidential (Transition) Bill' and made it widely available to the public, policymakers, CSOs and Ghana’s donor community. In 2009, a revised version of this draft Bill document was published. This updated edition, which captured the revisions that had been made in the latter consultation process and in response to the 2009 transition experience, was likewise widely disseminated.

In addition, when the Bill was presented to Parliament in late 2010, the IEA undertook a number of steps to expedite the passage of the proposed legislation. In this regard, the Institute published a policy brief on the proposed legislation in its Governance Newsletter, an influential IEA publication. The policy brief sought to highlight the key attributes of the Bill and to draw attention to the important role the proposed transition framework would play in Ghana’s democratic system. The urgent need to put the Bill’s arrangements place prior to the 2012 elections was also emphasized. The Governance Newsletter was distributed extensively to key decision makers, members of civil society, donors and the broader policy community. Importantly, the IEA ensured that all members of the Parliamentary Committee that was considering the Bill received a copy of the newsletter. An abridged version of the policy brief was also published in Ghana’s major newspapers. Overall, the feedback received indicated that the policy brief provided clarity on the Bill by putting its key tenets in the context of Ghanaian politics.

Impact

With regard to the factors that contributed to the Institute’s impact, the political context in Ghana provided the impetus to pursue policy change in this area. Hence, the Institute’s role in the decision-making process can be defined in terms of setting agenda, drafting the legislation, building the capacity of Parliamentarians and engaging in sustained advocacy to ensure its passage. Through the facilitation of
meetings and workshops between political parties and key stakeholders, the IEA was able to translate the resulting recommendations into a substantive proposal that, crucially, garnered cross-party support. Subsequently, the IEA focused on ensuring that momentum for the passage of the Bill was maintained.

The Institute also made a valuable contribution to governance in Ghana when the draft Bill was used as a guideline for the 2009 transition (although it lacked the force of law). The Institute’s role in developing this legislation was acknowledged by President Mills in his 2009 State of Nation address. In 2010, the president’s State of the Nation address also succinctly summed up the valuable impact of the IEA/GPPP when he noted:

The “Ghana Political Parties Programme” of the Institute of Economic Affairs...demonstrates what genuine reconciliation and collaboration, based on a spirit of wanting-to-work together, can achieve. As a result of their collaborative effort, a multi-partisan “Presidential Transition Bill” to regulate the process of transition from one Government to another and which will, I hope, put an end to the acrimony and bitterness that have characterized past transitions, has been agreed upon... Because of its multi-partisan nature, I am sure that Parliament will have no difficulty in passing it.

The four main strategies of influence outlined above all contributed to the Institute’s ability to impact this area of public policy. It is also worth reemphasizing that the successful passage of the Bill owes much to the IEA’s reputation for being independent. Only with such a reputation could an organization bring together political opponents to discuss and resolve an issue that itself highlights the difficulty of uniting political parties in Ghana. Notably, by the time that the Bill was initiated, the IEA/GPPP had already established itself as a rare forum where parties could come and work together to resolve issues that impacted them. Overall, the importance of consensus in formulating policy has shown to be crucial in order to ensure a successful outcome, as the approved transition legislation reveals that the IEA draft Bill underwent only minor amendments.

In terms of the contribution this episode of influence made to the institutional capacity of the IEA, the work involved provided the Institute’s young researchers an opportunity to gain practical experience in the legislative process and thus strengthened the Institute’s internal capacity.

Looking back

On reflection, the IEA could have done more to employ the use of social media as a strategic tool and thereby engage an even wider section of the population in its advocacy of the Transition legislation. For example, Ghana’s youth, particularly those in tertiary education, are known to use social media extensively. Looking back, the Institute could have engaged this important group in Ghana’s political sphere to galvanize further support for the legislation’s early approval. On the other hand, the broad consultation with diverse stakeholders, including political parties outside Parliament, was integral to the unanimous support the Transition legislation received. Overall, employing a strategy that involved only political parties in Parliament could have posed challenges down the line. This is because of the input that these stakeholders made to the draft Bill which certainly enhanced its effectiveness.
The Presidential (Transition) law is fundamentally an IEA initiative. The Institute responded to the issue of polarization in Ghanaian politics by impartially identifying the contributing factors and proposing a way forward. This case of successful policy influence provides evidence that taking ownership of policy proposals from conception to implementation remains crucial. The Presidential (Transition) Law will by no means remove all the difficulties relating to the democratic transfer of power. However, its enactment has strong potential to defuse the political fallout, accusations, and counter-accusations which have ensued in previous transitions.
IPAR’s Case: Agenda Setting During Presidential Elections in Senegal

Introduction

In Senegal, the first round of the presidential elections were scheduled for February 26, 2012, with a second round would be organized in March 2012, if necessary. Electoral campaigns are a great opportunity to promote changes that make a difference in the lives of people. However, the most pressing problems are not always the ones at the heart of the political debate. The Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR)\textsuperscript{13} has committed itself to bring agricultural and rural issues to center stage, within the context of the 14 political candidates of the presidential elections facing competing demands from constituents for attention on diverse policy issues.

The first section will provide a short presentation of IPAR, followed in the second section by a description of the political context of the demand for research. The third and fourth sections discuss the proposal and the strategy of influence, respectively. The fifth section presents the impacts of the institution on policy. The last section gives concluding remarks.

About IPAR

IPAR is a space for reflection, dialogue and proposals for cooperative agricultural and rural policies in Senegal and in the West African region. An association of researchers, policymakers, peasant leaders, senior members of ministries and civil society, IPAR was created in 2005 and formally recognized in 2008. IPAR’s mission revolves around three major areas: research, capacity-building, and dialogue facilitation, and its research aims to inform policy decisions. IPAR currently focuses on five areas of research: i) demographics, employment and migration; ii) agricultural performance; iii) land and natural resource management; iv) public policies; and v) emerging issues.

IPAR receives its core funding from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) through its Think Tank Initiative. Additional funding comes from competitive projects, including partners such as the World Bank, the French Development Agency and the Swiss Cooperation. IPAR’s annual budget is approximately USD 600,000.

Political context of the demand for research

Like many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal depends heavily on agriculture. This sector is an important source of export earnings and is the occupation of 60 percent of the economically active population. In the rural sector, on-farm activities continue to provide the main share of household incomes. In spite of this central role, the Senegalese agricultural sector has not overcome its food supply challenges and the level of rural poverty is still alarming. Geographically, Senegal lies within the Sahel, a high-risk environment for food production, where most agricultural land is rain-fed. Declines in annual precipitation, increasing in soil degradation, and ongoing land constraints make agricultural production a difficult enterprise for farmers. Most farmers’ major farming activities are adversely affected by a lack of

\textsuperscript{13} Prospective Agricultural and Rural Initiative
financial capital. Despite ongoing challenges and a central role in the economy, agriculture and rural issues have traditionally been excluded from public debate.

Early on, partly in response to a great demand from farmers’ organizations, IPAR perceived the February 2012 presidential elections as an opportunity to put key agricultural and rural issues at the heart of the electoral debate and to promote discussions of alternative solutions. A thorough work plan was developed and implemented in collaboration with various actors, including: i) farmers in a consortium of 28 peasant federations; ii) civil society, through a platform of 178 national NGOs; iii) policymakers, such as political candidates and the steering committees leading their campaigns; and iv) media outlets (print press, public and community radio, and television).

Proposal

From the onset, IPAR has collaborated with key partners to identify four strategic themes and accompanying questions, designed to feed the electoral debate:

1. Food security: Can family farms feed Senegal?
2. Jobs: Is agricultural and rural employment a credible response to the challenge of youth employment?
3. Land: What kind of land reform does Senegal need?
4. Funding: What types of funding should be allocated for agriculture?

The first two themes are based on IPAR’s own research results, the third is taken from a collaborative study conducted by IPAR with a peasant platform, and the fourth is based on evidence from an NGO partner’s study.

Following the electoral process, IPAR identified an approach with four phases:

a. Phase One: Mobilization of the media through a training workshop that aimed to inform and raise awareness of journalists.

b. Phase Two: Organization of an electronic forum, which brought together 123 stakeholders; the content of the forum evolved around the four strategic themes mentioned above; synthesis of these discussions were presented to the candidates’ representatives during a citizens’ forum.

c. Phase Three: In collaboration with the consortium of farmers’ organization (CNCR) and the platform of NGO Council Development Support (CONGAD), IPAR organized a citizen’s forum which mobilized 130 representatives of peasant organizations, civil society, local elected officials, policymakers, private firms, and donors; the forum was an occasion to engage direct discussions with representatives of the candidates for the presidential elections.

d. Phase 4: interviews with candidates through different media outlets (print, radio, TV).
Strategy of influence

To reach out to decision makers (political candidates and their representatives), IPAR initiated a process that required the establishment of internal and external alliances. Both IPAR’s executive branch and its board members were involved in validating the broad guidelines of the process. Given their high level profiles, they also facilitated contacts with the various presidential candidates.

External alliances were set up to generate the contents of the four strategic themes: in-house research evidence; collaborative work with the National Council for Consultation of Rural People (CNCR), a peasant platform; and evidence from a platform of NGOs. These external alliances also aimed to form a solid panel of stakeholders that could be influential in reaching out to decision makers. As a result of these alliances, IPAR was able to develop a cluster of organizations with shared views on the issues of agriculture and rural development and who were ready to exploit the presidential elections as an opportunity to engage in a process of evidence-based advocacy.

Several strategies were used to engage presidential candidates and their representatives. Each candidate was sent an official letter, which was accompanied by files containing policy briefs, memoranda, and briefings. Informal channels were also used to reach out to some of the candidates, including lobbying and the strategic use of gatekeepers.

Impact on policy

The multi-stakeholder platform for dialogue created by IPAR allowed for discussion of the candidates’ programs and proposals and addressed social, demographic, and economic issues and challenges facing Senegal, with a particular emphasis on the agricultural and rural sectors. The influence on the candidates was progressive and is ongoing. Below are some elements underpinning this process:
• Prior to the official electoral campaign, IPAR pulled out the fourteen candidates’ proposals that specifically addressed agricultural and rural issues and challenges and reviewed their proposed solutions. IPAR then positioned its four strategic themes against each of these different candidate proposals. Consequently, it became quite apparent that candidates had begun to refine their proposals to address the issues identified by IPAR and its partners.

• During the first round of the elections, at the citizens’ forum, the hearing involved representatives of seven candidates who were among the most representative of the political landscape. These representatives faced a conglomerate of civil society organizations and presented their candidate’s vision in agriculture and rural development before presenting three main commitments of their candidate.

• Besides the citizen’s forum, which was co-organized with CNCR and CONGAD, IPAR conducted a hearing of all fourteen candidates in the presidential elections, in partnership with the West Africa Democracy Radio (WADR) and the Union of community radios. These hearings materialized because of the commitments of the candidates.

• During the second round of the elections, only two candidates qualified. IPAR prepared a questionnaire for the WADR, whose journalists interviewed both candidates. Likewise, in partnership with TFM, a private television state with a large audience, representatives of the two candidates and experts from IPAR engaged in a debate, both in French and in one of the main national languages. These two events resulted in renewed commitments from the two candidates.

• Finally, this long process has generated evidence that will give stakeholders a monitoring tool to perform a citizens’ watch on the commitments of the president-elect. It is too early to conduct a thorough evaluation of the impact of the process. However, a few examples are worth underlining, given the fact that the president-elect, who was then still a candidate, made two short-term promises: i) to engage the donor community as soon as he is elected, in response to the food crisis that followed a disastrous rainy season; ii) to prepare the cropping season in a concerted way, to allow timely provision of inputs and to set a negotiated price for the main agricultural products. On these two promises, the president-elect has kept his word.

This process has also had a positive impact on IPAR. As a think tank with its own vision, it was challenging to conduct a debate between different actors and stakeholders on political issues while maintaining independence. On the one hand, the strategic fit between IPAR’s board and its executive management contributed to resolving this issue. On the other hand, a commitment to transparency throughout the process, the use of evidence-based advocacy, the use of public data when necessary, and the establishment of strategic alliances with legitimate partners have decisively contributed to the credibility of this process.
The actions taken in this process have allowed IPAR to be more visible as an institution, to disseminate its research results, and to build relationships with members of the president-elect’s campaign team, who play a key role in the current government.

**Conclusion**

In the pre-electoral context of Senegal, there were clear citizenship needs for open discussions on the various programs proposed by presidential candidates. IPAR recognized this favorable environment for policy influence and built its strategy on three key elements: planning, the use of evidence-based advocacy, and partnership.

Throughout the process, one of the challenges IPAR had to cope with was how to overcome the various competing issues from other sectors and/or segments of the population. Good governance, education, health provision, youth employment and security in the south of Senegal were among the central themes that retained people’s attention. Well-established urban pressure groups strived to advance these issues during the electoral campaign. In this context, only a well-conceived communication strategy, built around allies with complementary skills, could generate a successful outcome.

In conjunction with its various partners, IPAR succeeded in bringing agricultural and rural issues to the core of the policy debate during the electoral process. Most importantly, elements of capacity-building emerged as the candidates’ proposals gradually evolved, following feedback from various stakeholders during events facilitated by IPAR (forums, debates, and hearings). Finally, the president-elect has moved quickly to start implementing his promises.

Whether these positive signs will spread and last depends on citizens’ awareness and capacity to monitor the current president’s commitments. IPAR is in the process of disseminating CDs to citizens which document these commitments. IPAR’s website will also contain a window that gives a specific update on how these commitments are being fulfilled.
REPOA’s case: Informing poverty alleviation policies in Tanzania

About REPOA

Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) is a nongovernmental organization in Tanzania, which was formed in 1994 and commenced operations in 1995. REPOA seeks to deepen the understanding of and inform future policy on the causes, extent and nature of poverty, and to establish strategies to combat its spread throughout the country. REPOA considers research to be central to economic growth and poverty eradication. In addition, research is a vehicle for developing broad-based knowledge that can be used to make decisions and design realistic and effective evidence-based interventions. REPOA facilitates and undertakes economic and social research and trains stakeholders to understand the importance of using a research-based approach to influence policy dialogue and development. Research is central to economic growth and the reduction of poverty, as it establishes an insightful foundation for making decisions and designing interventions. REPOA believes in determining local solutions for national issues, drawing upon national and international research to garner knowledge to support these solutions. Hence, REPOA’s three main research themes are Growth and Development, Social Protection, and Governance and Service Delivery.

The organization’s reach is wider than simply within the sphere of research; it also fosters the advancement of local intellectual capacity and encourages the improvement of knowledge so it may be used effectively. REPOA serves the government of Tanzania, development partners, academics, members of civil society, the media, and the private sector. REPOA is well-recognized as a key contributor to development issues in Tanzania.

The budget for the implementation of the Strategic Plan for the five-year period (2010–2014) is USD 21.86 million. Of this, 67 percent (USD 14.55 million) is committed as core basket funding by REPOA’s development partners and 33 percent (USD 7.31 million) comes from other sources. The basket funding is provided by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Department for International Development (DFiD) and the Embassy of Sweden. In addition, IDRC’s Think Tank Initiatives fund our capacity building initiatives.

The political context of demand for research

REPOA has been engaged in a strategic relationship with policy making institutions and their processes since the second half of the 1990s. The key objective of these relationships was to ensure that findings and recommendations from relevant policy research are actually taken into account during policy development. During this same period, REPOA began this strategic engagement by participating in the development of Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Inherently donor-driven, the PRSP detailed a three-year poverty reduction plan, identifying six priority sectors where resources that were saved as debt relief had to be directed. The plan stemmed from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives. The government of Tanzania facilitated the participation of a variety of stakeholders in drafting of PRSP, including members of civil society and the private sector, although the timing requirements for qualifying for the initiative were rather short.
Recognizing this limitation, the review of PRSP was given adequate time, and much wider consultations were made with CSOs, the private sector, researchers and academia, local government authorities, and grassroots organizations. This ensured a much more homegrown strategy, as compared to the first-generation strategy for poverty reduction.

In 2001, at the inception of the Poverty Monitoring Master Plan, development partners made contributions to a pooled fund used to establish REPOA as the Secretariat to the Research and Analysis Working Group (RAWG) of the Poverty Monitoring System. Commissioned by the government, REPOA accepted this role, as it was considered to be strategic and would provide REPOA with the opportunity to influence policy development and promote informed policy debate through research and its established knowledge base. REPOA has continued to carry out this function to date. Composed of members from the government, civil society, and research and academic institutions, RAWG is a great avenue for dialogue among interested parties. RAWG’s membership is merit-based; members are required to have an academic background in the national development framework (MKUKUTA). Members join RAWG with expertise in growth, social service delivery and governance. The group’s chairperson comes from within the government because the process is governmental. Initially, the Director of macroeconomic department of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Empowerment chaired the meetings but in 2011, the Director General of the Commission for Science and Technology was designated to be the meeting chair. This planned transition has not yet taken place. Until 2008, RAWG met once a week, but since then RAWG meets as a need arises. While most activities are undertaken by the Secretariat, RAWG convenes in order to provide guidance on the progress of implementation.

So far, the main activities of RAWG have been to identify research priority areas, to commission studies in those areas, to monitor the research progress, and to widely disseminate the studies’ findings. While doing so, RAWG also built local capacity. Our engagement as an active Secretariat enabled us to utilize research outcomes in many of the products of the Research and Analysis Working group. These products include the Poverty and Human Development Reports (PHDR) (published since 2002), the Views of the People Survey, poverty mapping, additional thematic studies in social protection and energy, and various policy briefs. The authors of these thematic studies received funding from the Research and Analysis Working Group Budget (the poverty monitoring pooled fund driven by donors and the government). The studies were implemented by REPOA and in collaboration with research associates. The Views of the People Survey was designed to collect and analyze the views of Tanzanians on how the poverty strategy was contributing to growth and to their well-being. The objective of poverty mapping was to understand the spatial dimensions of poverty at sub-national levels. These studies also involved local capacity building. For instance, the first two PHDR and thematic studies were jointly produced by local and international researchers. Likewise, poverty mapping brought together researchers from REPOA, the National Bureau of Statistics, University of Dar es Salaam, and the World Bank (both from Tanzania and Washington DC). The last three PHDR have been produced mainly by local researchers.
Proposal

REPOA was commissioned to be the RAWG Secretariat because the government decided that the monitoring of poverty reduction strategies should be done by research institutions independent from the government. In this way, it was easier for REPOA to question the performance of the government than a representative or department from within the government could. During its inception, REPOA was a think tank focusing mainly on poverty issues, which was also the focus of the first PRSP. In addition, there was insufficient capacity within the government to undertake any analytical work. One key agenda was to enhance the evidence-based policy making in Tanzania, which was consistent with the objective of RAWG—to carry out research and analysis on issues relevant to the monitoring of policy revisions resulting from research. Over time, the shift towards a focus on growth resulted from the efforts of REPOA and other institutional members of RAWG. There has been more support than opposition to this shift, provided mechanisms for inclusive growth were articulated.

Strategy of influence

REPOA, as Secretariat to RAWG, reaches decision makers in different ways, primarily through the National Policy Dialogue (previously known as Poverty Policy Week, or PPW). This forum includes policymakers, development partners, academia, and civil societies, and in these events, different research outputs are presented and discussed, and next steps are identified. Since 1995, REPOA’s Annual Research Workshop (ARW) has been another avenue used to reach policymakers, along with a series of open seminars. Recognizing that there are also other studies held outside REPOA that are relevant to the development processes, these outside researchers and policymakers are invited to the REPOA workshop to discuss emerging issues. In some instances, CSOs and citizens are better positioned to pressure the government. However, most of the reports out of RAWG and REPOA are overly technical and difficult for citizens and CSOs to understand, so in such cases we popularize the reports with cooperation by relevant CSOs.

RAWG worked to influence policy makers in sector ministries and the parliament by providing an analysis of the status of the strategy implementation against targets, and by defining areas that needed more attention and funding.

Impact

The most notable contribution achieved by RAWG was to emphasize the conviction that a reduction in poverty cannot be realized without achieving economic growth. This new emphasis on economic growth was informed by a combination of various studies, dialogues, and exchanges with different stakeholders.

Because of REPOA’s influence—in various RAWG meetings, in PHDRs, and in our active participation in the review of the first-generation poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) in 2004—the second-generation poverty reduction strategy (known as the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, or MKUKUTA in Kiswahili) has identified economic growth as its focus in its first strategy cluster. Our influence continued throughout the implementation and monitoring of MKUKUTA. We insisted on a more focused growth strategy by including a chapter on rural growth priorities in PHDR 2005 and a
chapter on growth priorities for PHDR 2007, and a chapter on the state’s role in promoting growth in PHDR 2009. Each of these actions has influenced the direction of policy development, including the Five Year Development Plan and a more growth-focused MKUKUTA II (2010–2015).

Obviously, the process entailed an enhanced collaboration with different actors, resulting in collaboration in other activities. Specific training and capacity building initiatives were developed for CSOs and councilors, including instruction in budget analysis and expenditure tracking. Research themes were redesigned under the open competitive system to incorporate issues that emerged from policy dialogue.

Looking back
So far, the process has worked well. The active participation of RAWG depends on the level of commitment shown by the government to involve other stakeholders in policy processes. Other strategic avenues exist, designed to influence policy designs and implement evidence-based advocacy, including the engagement in consultancies with ministries and other public institutions and the dissemination of information to advocacy organizations.
CPD’s Case: Energizing the Grassroots for Accountable Development in Bangladesh

About CPD
The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) is a civil society think tank in Bangladesh established to promote research and dialogue among the principal stakeholders in the policy-making process. Beyond Bangladesh, CPD focuses on frontier issues concerning the development process in South Asia and the least developed countries (LDCs). A key area of CPD’s policy activism focuses on the organization of open and credible multi-stakeholder platforms, which seek constructive solutions to critical development challenges. These platforms are resourced with relevant information and analyses, while the outcomes of such dialogues are taken into account when pursuing further research. In this process, CPD builds public policy agendas and gives voice to the absentee stakeholders in the policy-making process.

CPD’s research, dialogue and outreach activities concentrate on issues relating to national economic policies, regional integration, and globalization. The organization’s work program is implemented by a professional staff of fifty to sixty people. An active participant in a wide network of regional and global institutions, CPD is financed by various development agencies and generates additional funds by selling services and publications. CPD’s annual budget is approximately USD 1.5 million.

The political context of the demand for the initiative
After three successive democratic elections, in 2006 Bangladesh was heading for yet another national election in an environment of entrenched and escalating confrontation between the two major political parties. Voters became apprehensive about the prospect of a fair and impartial election. The confrontational political scenario was emerging as a threat to the country’s hard-earned democracy, as well as to the development process. Concerned citizens maintained that the upcoming election had to be not only credible, but also free and fair. There were also worries that the escalating hostility in the polarized political structure might deflect pre-election attention from the major developmental interests of the country.

In light of these concerns, there was a widely held and expressed expectation among stakeholders that the civil society organizations—development NGOs, citizens’ groups, media, and professional and trade bodies—would play an important role in addressing the evolving situation. A large number of civil society stakeholders urged CPD to undertake initiatives to address the concerns of the citizens; they also promised their support in implementing the programs. Indeed, given its track record and its professional competence, goodwill, and outreach, CPD was well-placed to mobilize the major actors around a set of concrete actions to make the voice of the citizens heard in the corridors of power.

In this context, in early 2006, during the run-up to the national elections scheduled for January 2007, CPD embarked on a program involving a series of activities designed to promote an informed policy debate around critical national issues.
The program

CPD initiated a program titled “National Elections 2007: Civil Society Initiative for Accountable Development” in March 2006. The twin objectives of the program were to give voice to common citizens of the country so that their development interests and concerns would be reflected in the election manifestos of the major political parties, and to influence public opinion in order to encourage and pressure political parties to nominate competent candidates for the next parliamentary elections.

The program was launched through a high profile public event with over 500 attendees, including high level representatives from all major political parties and trade bodies, academics, non-government policy activists and development practitioners, trade union leaders, gender rights and environmental activists, performing artists and distinguished personalities, young professionals, and students. Nobel Laureate Professor Mohammad Yunus, also a founding member of the CPD Board of Trustees, presented a paper which highlighted the need for nominating and electing honest and competent candidates for the election. CPD shared a detailed activity plan with the participants and sought the participants’ support towards the implementation of the program. In carrying out the outreach, CPD partnered with the three most prominent media institutions of the country—Prothom Alo (the most circulated vernacular daily), The Daily Star (the most circulated English daily) and Channel i (a leading television channel). To broaden the ownership of the proposed program, CPD held broad-based consultations with professional bodies, private development agencies, the business community, and representatives from the media.

The program was implemented through eleven clusters of activities:

- An “Eminent Citizens’ Group” (Nagorik Committee) was constituted to prepare a “Vision” document which would formulate a medium-term outlook for Bangladesh, setting specific goals and targets for the year 2021, when the country celebrates its fiftieth year of independence. Prepared through a broad-based participatory process, the document was expected to influence the development program of the incoming governments and to serve as a reference point for the pre-election development discourse.

- Fifteen day-long Town Hall meetings were organized in major districts of Bangladesh to provide a unique non-partisan platform for stakeholders to voice their concerns and interests in the context of the upcoming election process. In addition, the meetings sought to prioritize national and local issues related to the development of the country. The maximum possible representation of the major constituencies and stakeholders was ensured through the participation of political leaders, academics, members of the business community, media representatives, trade union leaders, students, cultural activists, ethnic and religious minorities, NGOs, and grassroots activists. After an elaborate Q&A session, a questionnaire was circulated to elicit the views of the local people regarding national priorities and choices. These meetings were widely covered by the print and electronic media.
• Eight task forces, composed of leading professionals, were set up to develop a policy paper on specific issues intended to feed into the preparation of the Vision document. These issues were identified through an interactive process and developed through wide ranging consultations, carried out with the stakeholders at the Town Hall Meetings.

• A draft of the revised Representation of People’s Order (RPO) was prepared, indicating the amendments necessary to ensure that electoral laws and political conduct facilitate the participation of honest and competent candidates. Particular issues noted included reducing the need for campaign financing, providing the right to recall the member of parliament during tenure and the right to cast a “No” vote.

• Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with international development partners, newspaper editors, TV channel executives, young professionals, and legal experts were also organized at various points in time to share CPD’s thoughts on pre-election activities and program outcomes and to seek their expert opinion.

• Strategic partnerships and collaborative arrangements were forged with institutions and networks working in specific areas relevant to CPD’s program.

• To avoid duplication of work and to generate synergy, CPD also held interactive discussions with other groups and organizations involved with pre-election activities, through formal and informal discussions. Youths and non-resident Bangladeshis were given special attention. The perspectives of these two groups were reflected in the identification and elaboration of the development priorities.

• In addition to the Town Hall and Expert Group Meetings, FGDs, and other consultations, greater outreach was carried out through the following activities: (i) participation in televised talk shows, (ii) publication of special supplements in newspapers (in both Bangla and English) highlighting the discussions from the Town Hall meetings, (iii) presentation of a video summary of these discussions on television, and (iv) publication of advertisements in the media highlighting various program activities.

• At the end of the program, closer to the election dates, a National Policy Forum was held in Dhaka; the audience was drawn from all of the important stakeholder groups from across the country. Leaders of major political parties also attended the forum. The General Secretaries of the two major political parties received a document prepared by the Citizen’s Committee through the previously described elaborate process titled “Vision 2021” and a report highlighting the discussions in various platforms. The amendments to the election rules were distributed to the Election Commission for their consideration. Members of the Citizen’s committee also met with the President of Bangladesh to present reform proposals.
• The Vision document and reports on the launch meeting and Town Hall discussions were published and later distributed extensively to citizens across the country.

• After the elections, CPD planned to present the newly elected government with these documents. When national elections finally took place in December 2008 (after a two-year delay), CPD organized a series of sessions with members of the incumbent government’s cabinet to discuss the outcome of the program. These sessions were held under the caption “Development with Equity and Justice: Immediate Tasks for the Newly Elected Government.”

Before that, outcome of the CPD’s initiative was also shared with the non-party care-taker government that was in power during 2006-2008.

The strategic approach of the program

1. The strategic approach of CPD’s program was to broaden the policy discourse in the country by bringing the structured stakeholder groups on board and by encouraging the participation of concerned citizens. An important strategic focus was to include local and grassroots level concerns in the policy debates, which are usually confined to discussions dominated by urban elites in the capital. In this way, the program sought to increase the sensitivity of the political leaders regarding the perspectives of the general voters, in order to improve both vertical and horizontal accountability.

2. CPD’s other main strategic concern was to enhance citizens’ awareness about their right to be engaged in the public sphere of policy debates. To this end, CPD resorted to the deployment of a wide range of outreach tools, including the extensive use of print and electronic media and communication via the CPD’s website.

3. CPD initiated its program early in the pre-election period. Admittedly, any substantive program based on a participatory approach always needs time to generate momentum. Therefore, the program was designed with some flexibility to allow for mid-course correction and adjustment, if required.

4. An important element of CPD’s strategy was to create a concrete output from the participatory process that would have lasting relevance and value. Besides the Vision document, elaborate documentation of the citizens’ dialogues remains a rich record of high level policy activism by non-state actors.

5. While implementing the strategic concerns detailed above, CPD tried to be mindful not to create competitive pressure on the political parties but rather to position itself to be seen as a partner in promoting good governance.

Impact on policy and capacity-building of the institution

The impact of the CPD program on policy may be assessed from immediate and short-term as well as medium- to long-term perspectives. The program was able to instill in citizens the idea that they
deserved better governance, decent elections, and a fairer share in development. CPD’s program brought to the fore the concept of ‘honest and competent candidates,’ which captured the imagination of the people. At the concluding National Policy Forum in December 2006, which included approximately 1,300 attendees, the General Secretaries of both major political parties made public commitments to nominate clean candidates, to pursue good governance, and to encourage principled politics. The parties further committed that they would reflect the ideas generated through extensive public discussion in their manifesto and would pursue commensurate policies when elected. During the election campaign, publicity posters of many candidates included a common feature—the inclusion of the phrase “I am a clean and competent candidate—please vote for me.” Indeed, the newly elected Parliament included many new and relatively younger faces who were perceived to be clean; some of these new Members of Parliament became Ministers in the Cabinet, which was generally perceived to be clean.

The Bangladesh Vision 2021 document—prepared under the auspices of the Citizen’s Committee established at CPD’s initiative—included eight goals that were ultimately reflected in the election manifestos of the leading political parties. It is of interest and some satisfaction to note in this context that the Awami League, the party which subsequently won the election, incidentally named its manifesto Vision 2021 and included many of the policy suggestions put forward in the CPD’s Bangladesh Vision 2021. Over the last three years, the Awami League adopted a number of legislative initiatives and undertook implementation of several programs in line with the Vision document recommendations, albeit with varying degree of success.

The proposals for amendment of the 1972 RPO prepared under the CPD initiative included suggestions regarding the selection criteria for the candidates, the financing of the election, the establishment of a transparent electoral process, and the preparation of a genuine voters list, among others. When the Caretaker Government (CTG - an interim government installed mainly to conduct elections) was formed in January 2007, many of the suggestions generated by the CPD’s program were adopted by the Election Commission (EC) in their effort to conduct a free and fair election with relatively clean candidates. The amended RPO included, for the first time, the option of a “No” vote on the ballot paper; this was a key proposal that emerged during local level consultation. Conducted by a committed, competent, and non-partisan EC, the national elections held in 2008 were by far the most credible elections in Bangladesh’s history. Young voters participated in large numbers and, as mentioned earlier, many new candidates were elected to the Parliament with the help of an anti-incumbency mood and a demand for change.

Because the election was delayed, the CTG continued for about two years instead of the expected three months. During this time, CPD presented the Vision document to the head of the CTG. Many of the initiatives pursued by this government towards instituting good governance, tackling corruption, strengthening local governments, and establishing regulatory reforms, reflected citizens’ aspirations and bore the mark of what was contained in the Vision document.

After the elections, Ministers and high level policymakers of the newly elected government participated in CPD’s two-day conference “Development with Equity and Justice: Immediate Tasks for the Newly
Elected Government” in March 2009. This was a good opportunity to pursue the suggestions originating from CPD’s initiative. Indeed, since then CPD has continued to pursue the goals and targets identified in the Vision 2021 document and continues to challenge the government to implement the policies advocated in its own election manifesto.

More than eight thousand people took part in the fifteen Town Hall meetings. On a number of occasions CPD had to face questions about its motive. Citizens asked whether CPD was serving the interest of any vested quarters and questioned the identity of CPD’s sources of financing. However, by practicing its own code of transparency and accountability, showing support from its strategic partners, and being able to underwrite the related costs from internal sources (i.e., not taking program support from any external agency), CPD emerged from this exercise in civic activism with its reputation not only intact, but strengthened.

It must be mentioned that when CPD initiated this program in 2006, people were in a pre-election mood—keenly interested in and receptive to new ideas. This sentiment created an environment conducive to putting forward ideas about change. People were looking for a non-partisan forum. In strategic terms, the CPD’s carefully designed extensive outreach program, which included an early start and a partnership with the media, was instrumental in ensuring the expected impact.

Over time, this entire exercise revealed that an effectively motivated civil society creates a tremendous opportunity in Bangladesh for stimulating the spirit of civic activism for sustaining the democratic process and for making the government more accountable. In addition, as an institution CPD made a crucial transition—once predominantly a policy-influencing and policy advocacy think tank, CPD is now also focused on policy activism with greater social outreach. During this process, CPD has been able to raise its profile as a patriotic and non-partisan national institution.

This nine-month-long journey would not have been possible without effectively managed teamwork with all involved partners. CPD’s staff became more motivated and committed to social change and more aware in their knowledge that there was a need to blend research with the reality on the ground in order to change the circumstances of the disenfranchised people. Indeed, thanks to the program, the public’s view of CPD has been enhanced quite perceptibly, and people would like to see CPD take a more proactive role in Bangladesh’s socio-political scenario. This remains an enduring inspiration for CPD’s staff. Looking back

With the benefit of the hindsight, it appears that there should have been a component in the program designed to sustain the participation of the stakeholder groups in pursuing the implementation of the development priorities espoused in the Vision document. The program revealed a great enthusiasm among citizens for advancing public policy objectives, and this added component would have served this goal in a more organized and sustained manner. Young people, in their quest for change, were great supporters of the CPD initiative. Such a component would have ensured that key recommendations in the Vision document would be pursued by dedicated people in the next generation with a natural affinity and vision for change.
Similarly, some of the initiatives in CPD’s outreach strategy could perhaps have been further strengthened with the help of additional activities. For example, while CPD teamed up with two leading print and one electronic media outlet, in retrospect it appears that a dedicated television program focusing on the messages, relayed on a regular basis, with the participation of people with strong influence on public opinion, might have allowed CPD to take its message of promoting good governance to a wider audience.

Additionally, in order to involve more young people, an effective outreach activity might have been to organize essay and quiz competitions on subjects relating to CPD’s program, and to encourage participation by students of higher educational institutions. However, since the entire program was funded by CPD with support from partners, a number of good ideas floated at the time could not be implemented because of financial and time constraints. At the same time, the continued implementation of such a high-profile national campaign remains hostage to the ongoing confrontational political environment in the country.
CSTEP's Case: Dialogue to Establish Energy Efficiency Norms and Standards in India

Description of the think tank under study

Center for Study of Science, Technology and Policy (CSTEP) is a not-for-profit research organization incorporated in 2005 under Section 25 of the 1956 Companies Act. Its mission is to impact policy with informed and objective analysis of science and technology enabled options for inclusive and equitable economic growth. CSTEP is an interdisciplinary organization comprised of about forty-three researchers—eleven of whom hold PhDs—with specializations in science, engineering, economics and social science.

CSTEP’s approach to policy research is based on theory and computation. We develop scientific tools and models needed for policy research and analysis. Our current research is in the areas of energy, infrastructure, materials and national security. The organization’s work is primarily focused on India, but some research falls beyond its geographical boundaries. Work carried out by CSTEP is used by policymakers at the state and central government levels. Our research involves multiple stakeholders, including government, industry, and the private sector.

The interdisciplinary nature of the work is made possible by support from the Jamsetji Tata Trust, the SSN Trust, the Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation, the World Bank, the International Development Research Centre, the Government of India’s Ministries and Planning Commission, the Oak Foundation, the Narotam Sekhsaria Foundation, and philanthropic arms of several commercial organizations. In fiscal year (FY) 2010-11, CSTEP’s operating budget was Rs. 10 Crore (approximately USD 2.2 million). CSTEP is recognized as a Scientific and Industrial Research Organization by the Indian government’s Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and Ministry of Science and Technology.

Political context of the demand for research (implicit or explicit)

CSTEP’s participated as a knowledge partner for the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) of the Indian government’s Ministry of Power (MoP) in setting up a program—for the first time in India and to the best of our knowledge, the world—to develop a Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) mechanism to enhance energy efficiency in energy intensive industries. CSTEP’s study assisted BEE in computing baseline specific energy consumption (SEC) for designated companies (DCs) in seven industrial sectors.

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14 The financial year in India is from April 1–March 31.
15 BEE is a statutory body under the Ministry of Power set up by the government of India on March 1, 2002 under the provisions of Energy Conservation Act 2001.
16 PAT is a market based mechanism to enhance cost effectiveness of improvements in energy efficiency in energy-intensive large industries and facilities, through certification of energy savings that could be traded.
17 SEC is defined as the ratio of total energy input consumed within the plant boundary per ton of output or quantity of the product.
18 DCs are large energy intensive companies within eight industrial sectors accounting for 54 percent of the total energy consumed in India in 2007-08. Thermal power plant, Fertilizer, Cement, Pulp and Paper, Textiles, Chlor-Alkali, Iron & Steel and Aluminum are the eight industrial sectors.
sectors\textsuperscript{19} within the PAT mechanism. As a first step, the study examined different forms of material, processes and energy flows, raw material quality, and product mix used in sample plants in the Indian cement industry to develop the methodology.

In January 2008, the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, inaugurated the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), which outlines eight objectives, including the National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE). MoP and BEE were entrusted with preparing the implementation plan for NMEEE, which includes four market-based mechanisms to unlock energy efficiency opportunities. PAT is one such market-based mechanism which offers incentives to achieve greater energy efficiency than the specified SEC norms. The incentives, given to industries that cause emissions, take the form of certificates for energy savings that may be traded on special platforms with less efficient or otherwise underachieving organizations.

NMEEE is expected to provide annual fuel savings in excess of 23 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) per year, cumulative avoided electricity capacity addition of 19,000 megawatt (MW) and CO\textsubscript{2} emission mitigation of 98 million tons (Mt) per year by 2014–15. PAT is expected to provide 6.6 Mtoe energy savings over three years.

Energy consumption norms and standards were officially publicized by MoP in the Gazette of India on March 30, 2012. The first PAT compliance period is from April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2015.

The design of the methodology used to compute baseline SEC took into account industry diversity, different forms of energy, product mix and age of the plant, SEC was computed and then normalized by considering additional sector-specific information like process technology, process flow, capacity utilization and raw material quality and product variations. The baseline SEC was then calculated by taking the average of normalized SEC of three financial years, i.e. 2007–8, 2008–9, and 2009–10.

In the next step, a comprehensive study of energy efficiency in the cement industry was conducted. The study utilized the aforementioned methodology and examined the different processes, energy flows, energy efficient (EE) technologies, and techno-economics of EE measures. The study engaged BEE, several leading cement manufacturers in India, trade groups and associations, and non-governmental organizations, including the Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation.\textsuperscript{20} The study included several elements recommended by the BEE and the cement industry.

Proposal

CSTEP prepared a detailed case study examining energy efficiency in the cement industry. The cement industry is the third-largest consumer of energy among all industrial sectors in India and produces the highest greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions within these sectors.

\textsuperscript{19} Thermal power plant was not included in the study.

\textsuperscript{20} The Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation is a regional climate foundation and the Indian arm of U.S.-based Climate Works.
The team worked with BEE to design primary energy efficiency data formats for sample plants in the cement industry. The study utilized the methodology proposed to BEE for computing baseline SEC, examined the cement manufacturing process in detail, and discussed the various sub-processes. Other tasks in the proposal include:

1. Identify different classes of plants within the cement sector and their energy intensity indicators. Prepare process, energy and material flow maps for each class of plant. Model techno-economics of energy efficiency improvement options and develop cost curves. Develop a computational tool to capture the above results that could be utilized for assessment by any cement industry.

2. Develop a PAT simulation model and a set of critical decision and policy scenarios for its implementation.

3. Identify energy reduction potential in various processes in a plant. Identify the investments for and economic viability of different options for saving energy. Identify perceived barriers to EE improvement in each class of plant.

4. Identify specific policy initiatives that will motivate behavioral change. Discuss the recommended progressive norms and standards for EE improvement for different plants in the cement industry.

5. Discuss the effect of EE targets across different classes of plants and across the plant clusters.

6. Develop a useful EE indicator tool, to provide users with the ability to compute the techno-economic feasibility of various EE process and technology improvements under variable plant configuration.

7. Propose specific EE improvements for each plant class that align with the company’s business goals, such as Internal Rate of Return (IRR), lower input cost, higher profit, and improved Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance.

The proposal was prepared considering valuable inputs from BEE, industry and the funding agency. The motivation and the objectives of the stakeholders were considered and addressed during the course of the study.

**Strategy of influence**

CSTEP directly reached out to the multitude of stakeholders involved. Regular meetings were held with different BEE officials, including energy economists and the Director General. Two interactive workshops were organized in Bangalore to pursue a consultative dialogue process and to build consensus among all the primary stakeholders; namely, the Government of India, cement manufacturers, and nongovernmental organizations. Some of the workshops’ participants included ACC, Ambuja Cement, Chettinad Cement, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Cement Manufacturers Association (CMA),

CSTEP facilitated meetings that were used as platforms to raise awareness about PAT and to improve the methodology. The cement industry’s concerns about the methodology were addressed by government officials, and challenges associated with different energy efficient technologies were also articulated. The final meeting culminated with the launch of the technical report “A study of energy efficiency in the Indian cement industry.”

CSTEP also organized visits to cement plants and corporate offices to interact with the operators, plant managers and key decision makers. These one-on-one meetings were extremely useful to disseminate information on PAT and to understand the concerns, which were analyzed and then communicated by CSTEP to BEE. It needs to be emphasized that CSTEP played an important role in communicating the concerns of the industry to the BEE, and addressing some of the concerns while assisting the BEE in developing the methodology CSTEP was also invited to make presentations and provide recommendations during discussions and workshops organized by BEE in conjunction with the cement industry. The discussions, meetings and the briefs prepared by CSTEP were crucial in establishing some of the goals set forth in the PAT framework.

**Impact of the institution on policy**

CSTEP assisted BEE in developing the methodology to implement the Indian government’s energy efficiency goal, as established under NMEEE. CSTEP was also involved with organizing stakeholder meetings—establishing the agenda, moderating the sessions and ensuring that the process took place in a consultative and collective manner. Only those recommendations accepted by a majority of the stakeholders were included in the report.

The methodology was used by the government to establish baseline SEC of 478 DCs in seven industrial sectors. The manufacturing plants were officially notified of the baselines and the energy consumption norms and standards on March 30, 2012. Thus, CSTEP made direct, important interventions to the initiative at several points in the project, which evolved into a robust methodology. The collaborative effort resulted in a definitive direction, together with a time-bound norm, for the participating industries to achieve the NMEEE goals to reduce GHG emissions.

An important factor which needs to be highlighted in the development of the methodology and organizing the workshops was the active participation and willingness exhibited by the industry in evolving SEC norms. The enthusiastic response revealed the industry’s inclination to reduce and offset its operating expenditure with energy savings.

This project was the first of its kind for CSTEP. The processes, understandings, and interaction with multiple stakeholders have established a template CSTEP may use to pursue similar initiatives in the future. As part of this plan, the organization established policies to respect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the information associated with such projects. Another important result of the
project was CSTEP’s one-of-a-kind report, which serves as a practical guide for achieving energy efficiency in the cement industry.

Several new opportunities have resulted from the lessons learned and the contributions made during the course of this project. CSTEP team members have been invited to speak at the World Energy Council meeting, and CSTEP is convening an industry group in the Planning Commission’s ongoing study on low carbon strategies for inclusive growth. Chaired by the Prime Minister of India, the Planning Commission is the highest-level agency responsible for policy formulation for all sectors in the country.

Looking back

In order to evaluate our overall performance and our progress toward fulfilling the project objectives, we would like to establish a scorecard to be used for this purpose. Periodic monitoring of performance would likely have given us a better understanding of the efficiency of the process utilized. If a benchmark had been established at the outset, we could have compared our progress to this benchmark and had been able to better understand the efficiency of the employed strategy. In addition, it would have been useful to have begun the project with an understanding of the economic impact of the policy on product costs and on global competitiveness.

In conclusion, CSTEP's contribution enabled the PAT scheme to be notified by the government in March 2012, coinciding with the completion of the project and we are grateful to the Think Tank Initiative of IDRC for helping us to focus on a nationwide scheme with immense economic and social benefits.
IIDS's case: Affirmative Action in the Private Sector in India

About IIDS
The Indian Institute of Dalit Studies (IIDS) is a nongovernmental, non-profit organization founded by civil society activists and academicians who sought to understand the problems affecting discriminated groups, to identify the causes of their marginalization, and to suggest policies for their empowerment. With this goal in mind IIDS conducts research studies in the following areas:

1. Examining the nature of social exclusion and discrimination facing certain groups (namely Dalits, tribals, religious minorities, nomadic and de-notified tribes, and similar groups) in the economic, social, and political spheres. In particular, IIDS studies the nature of discrimination in political participation, in markets such as land, labour, capital, and services, and in social services, including education, health care, housing, water, food, and others.

2. Considering the effect of market discrimination on access to income-earning assets and employment and on the income and poverty levels of discriminated groups.

3. Suggesting policies for discriminated groups and introduces measures to overcome the consequences of exclusion and discrimination.

4. Understanding the collective action of discriminated groups.

5. Addressing the special problems affecting women from discriminated groups.

6. Conducting knowledge support and capacity-building of civil society organizations (namely NGO’s and CBO’s), funding bodies, and government so that they develop inclusive policies.

Political context of the demand for research
The Indian government has an affirmative action policy for two social groups, the scheduled-caste (SC) and scheduled-tribe (ST). These two groups account for about one-fourth of India’s total population and historically have suffered from discrimination in multiple spheres. Under the affirmative action policy (commonly referred to as the ‘reservation policy’), about 25 percent of government jobs and positions in public educational institutions are earmarked for SC and ST individuals. However, the policy is confined to the public sphere and excludes private-sector employment and private educational institutions.

In the early 1990s the government implemented structural adjustment reforms. The main result of this policy was the privatization of certain public enterprises and government services. This privatization resulted in a reduction in government sector jobs. As a consequence of this privatization, the number of jobs affected by the affirmative action employment policy (reserved jobs) was also reduced. The move amounted to the de-reservation of public employment.

In 1995, Professor Sukhadeo Thorat (founding Director and Permanent Trustee of IIDS) wrote an article on the new economic policy and its impact on affirmative action. The Indian government recognized the
issue and looked for solutions but was ambivalent about instituting an affirmative action policy for the private sector.

Private businesses opposed such a policy on the basis that their hiring policies were already non-discriminatory, as they were governed only by the merit and efficiency of candidates. Although the private sector recognized the problem of inequality, it favored a more general policy with respect to educational development and economic empowerment. Discriminated groups argued that private-sector hiring policies involved discriminatory practices and therefore required affirmative action.

The conflict raised various questions which called for further research. Both the government and discriminated groups pushed for research. The government wanted justification for some sort of policy and an understanding of the nature of such a policy, and discriminated groups needed to demonstrate the discriminatory hiring practices of the private sector.

Thus IIDS became involved in research on number of issues related to the case for affirmative action. It studied the discriminatory hiring process of private employers, the effects on discriminated groups, the nature of the affirmative action policy to be adopted by the government, and the issue of merit and efficiency in such a policy.

Key actors involved in the affirmative action policy-formation process included the national government (specifically the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment and the Prime Minister’s Office); the private corporate sector—namely, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Associate Chamber of Commerce (ASSOCHAM), the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industries, and other industry associations; various SC and ST associations; the academic community; and multinational companies (MNCs). These groups partnered with the Indian Industries and international bodies such as the United Nations, both of which promote non-discriminatory principles for MNCs.

Proposal

The discussion on a possible affirmative action policy began in mid-1990s, and IIDS joined the dialogue after its establishment in 2003. In the early years of the debate, Professor Sukhadeo Thorat led the policy engagement process individually; later, he worked in collaboration with IIDS researchers. The affirmative action policy eventually proposed by IIDS included the following provisions:

1. Legal safeguards in the form of Equal Opportunity Laws or Non-Discrimination Laws;

2. Affirmative action quotas in private employment and capital, measures to improve access to inputs necessary to start private enterprise, and quotas mandating the government to procure a certain percentage of consumer goods from SC/ST entrepreneurs;

3. Affirmative action measures for MNCs which had signed the UN Principles of Equal Opportunity, Global Sullivan Principles, Ambedkar Employment Principles, and International Fair Trade Principles; and
4. A monitoring mechanism to oversee government implementation of the affirmative action policy.

In short, the affirmative action policy consisted of a compulsory quota system proportional to the affected groups’ share of the population, with a monitoring mechanism designed to oversee the implementation of the policy. A modified version of the affirmative action policy was finally accepted by the private sector in 2007.

The proposal was based on a variety of research that the IIDS carried out, detailed below.

1. IIDS looked at the nature of discrimination in private-sector hiring practices. Researchers examined the existing literature, performed research in collaboration with Princeton University on hiring practices in small urban companies, and studied similar policies from other countries that could potentially serve as future models.

2. IIDS reviewed the justification for a quota-based affirmative action policy in private employment, and generated evidence from the literature to support the notion that such a policy will not reduce productive efficiency.

3. The government asked IIDS to undertake two studies: one on the economic concession (such as tax concessions) to the private industries, and another on private-sector affirmative action policies in eighteen other countries. Both studies were designed to build the case for affirmative action in the Indian private sector.

4. The IIDS published a book called Reservation and Private Sector: Quest for Growth and Equal Opportunity, which compiled several papers related to the debate and presented various views on the issue.

Thus, based on the research, IIDS prepared a proposal on affirmative action in the private sector. The proposal was presented in books, published in reputed research journals such as Economic and Political Weekly and Seminar and included in newspapers widely read by the corporate sector, such as Economic Times. The proposal was also presented in a conference organized by the Association of Industries, and was publicized through television shows. A summary of the proposal was presented to the Indian government and the private sector.

At the CII Annual Session in 2006, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, appealed to industry to reach out to the marginalized sections of the SC and ST groups in order to enable the country’s economic growth to be more inclusive. CII responded by setting up a Council on Affirmative Action and implemented a voluntary and self-regulatory affirmative action policy. The policy was finally announced with the consent of the government in 2007.

The main features of the final policy were:
1. Voluntary and self-regulatory affirmative action by the three industry associations: Confederation of Indian Industries, Association of Chambers of Commerce and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

2. A Code of Conduct for Affirmative Action, which commits to non-discrimination, assistance, and transparency with respect to employees and suppliers to companies when hiring from the SC and ST communities. This was also a voluntary commitment.


4. Periodic private-sector reporting on the progress of affirmative action to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment and the Prime Minister’s Office.

The IIDS proposal was successful in various respects. First, the affirmative action policy was accepted by the private sector, but was not made compulsory. Rather, it was made voluntary and self-regulatory with some accountability and informal monitoring by the government. Secondly, affirmative action without quota was accepted in employment, education, skill development and the promotion of enterprises, with the purpose of increasing the economic and educational empowerment of SC and ST. And as recently as 2011, a quota in the government purchase process was introduced, requiring the government to make 20 percent of its purchases from SC and ST businesses.

**Strategy of influence**

IIDS shared its research findings on the issue with government policymakers and policymakers from the private sectors. The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, which was tasked with developing an affirmative action policy, asked IIDS to undertake the two studies previously mentioned. The results of these studies were shared with the Ministry.

Secondly, the government asked the Association of Industries to present their own proposal on some form of affirmative action. Therefore, IIDS also interacted with and provided knowledge support to private industries (through discussions, lectures and roundtables), particularly to the Council on Affirmative Action. IIDS also shared its research with the Association of Industries and the committee set up by ASSOCHAM for this purpose. Thirdly, IIDS was also involved in responding to the arguments of academics who were opposed to a private-sector affirmative action policy.

The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment was the primary policy actor engaged with IIDS. The Institute worked with the Minister of SJE, its government official and with the forum of SC/ST Members of Parliament. In addition, IIDS had the opportunity to engage with the Prime Minister, the former President of India, and other prominent leaders who contributed to the decision-making process.

The Institute also consulted with policy makers from the private sector, along with the Chairman and members of the private-sector committee tasked to develop its own policy. Additionally, IIDS shared relevant policy information with opinion-shapers such as members of the print and television media. To
summarize, IIDS targeted different audiences to accomplish its goal and was able to inform and dialogue with the government, the private sector, and civil society organizations.

Other important actors involved in the process (besides the government and Association of private industry) were academics and the media, who each held different views. To counter these arguments and to create a favorable atmosphere to advocate policy, the Institute contributed papers to research journals and wrote articles in newspapers outlining its position.

Equally important was IIDS’s engagement with leaders and Members of Parliament belonging to the SC and ST who favored the policy but lacked the knowledge support to properly argue inside and outside Parliament. The Institute provided these leaders with literature and held discussions to properly educate them on the policy.

**Impact of the institution on policy**

IIDS had an impact on policy in six distinct ways. First, it identified the problems stemming from the privatization of the Indian economy. Second, it developed an argument in favor of an affirmative action policy for the private sector. Third, it responded to those who suggested alternative measures to affirmative action. These alternative measures included general economic and educational policies for the poor as a whole (including SC/ST), economic and education programs for SC/ST without reservation in employment in the private sector, and preference in employment without quota. Fourth, it prepared a research-based affirmative action proposal for the private sector. Fifth, it engaged important policymakers, stakeholders and decision makers. And finally, it helped advocacy groups put forth the proposal to the government and the general public. While IIDS was not involved in policy implementation, which was the responsibility of the government and the private sector, it is currently involved in evaluating the private sector’s implementation of the policy.

The factors which contributed to the institution’s impact on policy were:

- Quality theoretical and empirical research on the issue enabled the Institute to make convincing arguments in favor of the proposed policy and to counter the arguments of the policy’s opponents;
- Publication of books, papers, policy briefs, and proposals intended to influence the views and opinion of policymakers;
- Engagement with decision makers; and
- Dissemination of the research and the policy proposal through media outlets and other forums.

Furthermore, this episode of influence helped to enhance the institutional capacity of IIDS by encouraging researchers to undertake studies on labor market discrimination and to learn more about the field’s methodologies. As a result of this policy work, IIDS became known as a leading institution in the study of economic discrimination.
The successful policy influence brought visibility and recognition to the Institute as a center of excellence for the study of social exclusion and inclusive policies. This increased visibility resulted in a research partnership with the prestigious Princeton University. The success of this collaboration, which ultimately led the private sector to develop an affirmative action policy, brought not only recognition to IIDS but also increased the researchers’ confidence in undertaking future policy research and advocacy. Internally, the Institute has now set up a separate unit focused on studies of social exclusion and discrimination.

**Looking back**

IIDS was instrumental in developing the affirmative action policy from inception to conclusion. This success story shows the Institute’s journey from research to policy influence to the final announcement of the policy. IIDS used comprehensive methods to influence policy.

IIDS was instrumental in developing the policy of Affirmative Action in the Private Corporate Sector during each stage of the process. Steps taken included:

1. Identifying the problem;
2. Undertaking academic research:
3. Conducting research for the ministries responsible for developing the policy;
4. Publishing research in popular dailies and through reputed publishing houses;
5. Providing research support to the private-sector committee established to frame this policy; and
6. Helping advocacy groups within the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) organize conferences at the national level with key members of government and members of parliament. At these conferences, IIDS prepared the outline detailing the affirmative action policy in the corporate sector.

In retrospect, IIDS worked and engaged with every possible channel to achieve this type of policy influence. IIDS consistently provided solid evidence to the issue and engaged with policymakers through multiple channels.
ISET-Nepal’s Case: The Adoption of a Local Adaptation Plan in Nepal

About ISET-Nepal

In November 2011, the Government of Nepal (GoN) formally approved a local adaptation-planning framework (LAPA). With the help of funding from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Union (EU), LAPA is being implemented in thirteen districts of midwestern Nepal. This policy measure was approved during a period when Nepal was going through unprecedented social and political transition. The answer to how this policy was approved may be found in research conducted by the Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal (ISET-Nepal), an interdisciplinary nongovernmental research organization based in Kathmandu. ISET-Nepal’s mission is to serve as an innovative platform for evidence-based policy advocacy, primarily at the national level but also regionally and globally. ISET-Nepal receives funding from bilateral and international donor agencies. This paper details how ISET-Nepal’s research in climate change adaptation has contributed to the design of a framework for adaptation planning at the local level in Nepal.

ISET-Nepal is guided by the philosophy that the policy terrain must be democratic and plural. Only in such an environment can the government, the market and civic movements engage constructively. Our research generates knowledge at the intersection of the social and natural science disciplines through a collaborative global partnership informed by locally rooted research. Through this type of engagement and dissemination of knowledge, ISET-Nepal has been able to directly contribute to policy processes, rather than just explicitly conducting research to change public policies.

Context of adaptation research

Most research that contributes to policy processes in Nepal is supply driven. The decision to implement LAPA stems from locally rooted research contributing to policy processes. The LAPA was driven by demand by local stakeholders. When the Government of Nepal (GoN), with support from the Least Developed Country Fund, DFID, and the Danish International Development Agency, was preparing the National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA), local stakeholders emphasized their demand for LAPA. DFID subsequently provided support that aided in the design of LAPA, which was undertaken through the Climate Adaptation Design and Piloting Nepal (CADP-N) program under the aegis of Nepal’s Ministry of Environment (MoE) in 2010.

Adaptation to climate change is an understanding in the making, and systematic methodology to design strategies for adaptation has not yet been developed. Such methodology is necessary to determine the type of environmental impact certain groups or areas may encounter. While climate change is a global phenomenon, it also has vulnerabilities and impact at the local level. The LAPA framework has proposed methodology to identify people and regions likely to be vulnerable, and to prepare strategies to build adaptive capacity and resilience. Systems developed by ISET-Nepal as the basis for assessing vulnerability were used in developing this methodology. This framework is expected to create opportunities to mainstream climate change adaptation into development planning processes (Regmi
and Karki, 2010). Adapting to climate change in transitional sociopolitical contexts, such as the current climate in Nepal, is a major challenge for research and policy making. Climate change is likely to bring about dynamically changing circumstances. As a result, these policies must have built-in measures to monitor key performance indicators, which must be used to trigger timely adjustments—even though not all situations, particularly in reference to climate change, can be anticipated. Adaptation research in Nepal has begun to change this trend.

From 2010 to 2011, ISET-Nepal, International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED), ISET-I, and seven Nepali NGOs (Britain Nepal Medical Trust, LIBIRD, RIMS Nepal, Rupantaran-Nepal, Rural Self Reliance Development Centre, and Nepal Water for Health) were involved in the design process of these local plans. ISET-Nepal proposed a method for assessing vulnerability by using the status of systems (such as energy, water, forest communication, and health) at the ward level of a Village Development Committee (VDC), the lowest unit of local governance. ISET-Nepal also reviewed the level of access to services from these systems in ten selected districts. National Planning Commission (NPC) of Nepal has also incorporated the concept of using systems as a guiding framework in its document aimed at making Nepal’s plans resilient. The knowledge that contributed to the development of this framework was based on more than a decade of research on adaptation carried out by ISET-Nepal and its various partners.

**Proposal**

The content of the research was determined by the broad global context of research on climate change adaptation. In particular, climate change makes the policy-making process challenging for two reasons. First, climate change makes hydrological processes like precipitation increasingly uncertain for the future. Conventional approaches to policy making involve the gathering of facts; after analyzing the facts, policy makers use lessons they learn to help develop policy. In a changing climate, this method is unsuitable because historical facts do not represent the future. Secondly, climate change uncertainty is nested within the larger sociopolitical realm. Differences in values, norms, capacity, and power within this realm affect how policies are utilized. The policies must be founded on local institutional capacity, global engagement and include approaches with the built-in flexibility to respond to uncertainties and surprises.

This context, along with with three interrelated factors in Nepal’s sociopolitical landscape, pose challenges to policy making. First, in 1996, six years after a multiparty political system was re-introduced, Nepal saw the beginnings of a ten-year long armed insurrection that finally ended in 2006. Subsequently, Nepal abolished its 240-year-old monarchy and became a republic. This shift to a republic has yet to stabilize, as the country aims to change the structure of the national government and reorganize its internal political boundaries. These dynamics present numerous challenges for effective policy making, as the sociopolitical landscape in the country is becoming increasingly fragmented and polarized. The second challenge is Nepal’s continued and prolonged so-called “development deficit,” which is the outcome of historical, geopolitical, and other structural factors. At present, these factors are compounded by the country’s political transition, which further increases this deficit. Lack of
affordable and reliable clean energy is also a critical indicator of the country’s backwardness. Nepal’s third challenge is rooted in its education system. Changes must be made within the existing education system in order to encourage the development of the type of creative thinking and interdisciplinary analytical skills that are essential for learning to deal with the challenges of a complex world. Nepal’s policy processes therefore need to be examined within the country’s ongoing and changing sociopolitical and institutional landscape, which is tied to the emerging vulnerabilities likely to be brought about by global climate change.

Through the work of researchers in both South Asia and the United Sates, these proposals were developed and implemented in just over a decade. This ongoing research addressed three critical gaps in knowledge confronting ISET-Nepal with respect to future implications for policy making. The uncertainty of climate science is the first knowledge gap. Accurate assessment of future precipitation is not possible because global circulation models cannot reveal much about local changes. As such, changes in local climates cannot be attributed to global climate change processes. The second problem requiring further research is the notion that it is not easily possible to differentiate between adaptation and development, because they are two opposite ends of a continuum (McGray et al., 2007) and support each other. In many parts of the world, successfully adapting to climate change impacts is linked to development (Huq and Reid, 2009). The blurred difference between adaptation and development is a major constraint in our efforts to make decisions about adaptation for an uncertain future. This limitation is a major challenge for policy makers.

The third gap is the relationship between autonomous and planned adaptation. Most people respond proactively to pressures within the limits of their capacities, perceptions, and priorities. Such pressure may also be posed by climate change. Planned adaptation, on the other hand, includes those strategies and actions initiated by a government in order to shape its policies, programs, and projects in response to climate change impacts. Planned responses are path-dependent and work in the long-term, whereas autonomous adaptation is short-term, spontaneous, and immediate, and to a certain extent it is localized.

How can these three gaps in knowledge be addressed by national policy making? In the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adaptation has been defined as an indication of the extent to which societies can tolerate changes in climate. However, this concept was not adopted as a policy objective of the response to climate change (Schipper, 2009). In the process, adaptation became the overlooked cousin of greenhouse gas mitigation only to be resurrected much later. The fact that existing global climate change policies overlooked adaptation in this context has had a bearing on national policies as well. Many national policy instruments, including Nepal’s, lacked provisions for climate change adaptation. Insights drawn from research were presented as books, journal articles and presentations.
Research to policy

In keeping with our conception of plural policy terrain, ISET-Nepal engages with a variety of partners, both on the local and global level. These partners include research organizations, academics, and other diverse institutions. The choice, scale and duration of any individual partnership depend upon the nature of the research conducted. ISET-Nepal also engages with self-help groups, community-based organizations, village development committees (local government bodies), local NGOs, district-level government offices, and district development committees (higher-level local government bodies).

Within the country, ISET-Nepal has engaged with the Ministry of Environment, the Department of Water-Induced Disaster Prevention, the Water and Energy Commission, I/NGOs, development agencies, and chambers of commerce and industry. These contacts help us draw on intellectual resources and formulate local and global solutions. Our wide reach enhances our legitimacy and provides us with the intellectual clout crucial to influencing national policies. Based on evidence generated by decade-long research on climate change adaptation, these factors contributed to the successful mainstreaming of climate change adaptation. Lessons and analysis from research on resource management, decentralization, and an assessment of vulnerability central to adaptation planning also backed these insights.

When the Government of Nepal began preparing its national plan for adaptation, these research findings on adaptation informed public dialogue. Though the plan identified adaptation options, it did not propose mechanisms to deliver adaptation services at the local level because most of the options had a sectorial focus. The LAPA design was conceived as an instrument to reach the local level.

The policy design received support from Nepal’s Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiative Coordination Committee (with representation from government departments, donors, and NGOs) and the Climate Change Council (CCC). In addition, the Ministry of Local Development (MoLD) expressed interest in the framework as it aimed to link adaptation with local development. Subsequently, the document was discussed in four regional consultation meetings with local stakeholders. Not only did it receive their buy-in, local stakeholders recommended that municipalities also be included in the process. The global research conducted in part by ISET-Nepal provided the intellectual onus for this issue.

Impact of the institution on policy

The story discussed above is an example of the myriad ways that research can contribute to the design of policy instruments intended to influence well-being. In this particular case, the goal was to implement adaptation activities at a local level using funds that Nepal would receive from various international funders. ISET-Nepal’s long-term engagement in interdisciplinary research on adaptation, which spans a number of geographical regions, helped establish the legitimacy of the researchers and the organization. In addition, ISET-Nepal’s engagement with global scholars and local stakeholders, using high quality research products, contributed to the organization’s impact on policy. To engage local level stakeholders, ISET-Nepal used radio dramas, other sources of media, and books in the Nepali language.
In addition, the organization engaged the younger generation by offering them support for interdisciplinary research.

This engagement has given ISET-Nepal the impetus to build its institutional capacity, in order to be better able to respond to challenges and effectively implement the goals of the LAPA in a post-conflict Nepal. ISET-Nepal’s outputs are intended to influence policies when a relatively stable political order emerges. This has helped us focus on building an internal governance structure to undertake grounded interdisciplinary research, building a foundation that supports policy making, even if the window of opportunity for the formal implementation of policies may not be evident during research.